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This Article challenges the existing paradigm in international law that
frames global efforts to address climate change as a problem of and for interna-
tional environmental law. The most recent climate reports tell us that warming is
unequivocal and that we are already experiencing the impacts of climate change
at the domestic level in the United States. Against this backdrop, much has been
written recently in the United States about domestic efforts to address climate
change. These efforts are important, but they leave open the question of how the
global community can work together to address the greatest collective action prob-
lem of our time. Focusing on international efforts to address climate change, this
Article pushes back against the dominant framing of global climate change as a
problem of and for international environmental law. It argues that the static
nature of the existing global paradigm brings about two primary harms. First, the
failure to address climate change overshadows the larger field of international
environmental law in a way that inhibits efforts to address a suite of persistent
environmental problems beyond climate change. Second, framing climate change
as a traditional environmental law problem constrains efforts to think more cre-
atively about how to address a problem that defies classification as an environ-
mental issue and demands innovative governance approaches. In making the
legal case for delinking the debates about international environmental law and
global climate change, this Article argues that challenging the existing global
p radigm is critical to thinking more constructively about collective action in the
climate context.
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I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & THE BIGGEST, THE
GREATEST, THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF THEM ALL
The problem is great, massive even, and recognition of the problem is
widespread. It has been variously characterized by leading legal and political
figures as the “biggest global-health threat of the 21st century,”1 “the great-
est market failure the world has seen,”2 the “biggest human rights issue of
the 21st century,”3 the “great moral challenge of our time,”4 “the new great
threat to biodiversity,”5 “by far the most important and fundamental issue
1. Anthony Costello et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change, 373 THE
LANCET 1693, 1693 (2009).
2. Alison Benjamin, Stern: Climate Change a ‘Market Failure’, THE GUARDIAN, Nov.
29, 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/nov/29/climatechange.carbonemis
sions (quoting Sir Nicholas Stern).
3. Former Irish President Mary Robinson: Climate Change the Biggest Human Rights Issue of
Our Time, DEMOCRACY NOW (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/2012/12/4/fmr_
irish_president_mary_robinson_climate (quoting Mary Robinson).
4. Climate Change: The Great Moral Challenge of Our Generation, YOUTUBE (Aug 6,
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQZvpRjGtGM.
5. Convention on Biological Diversity, Climate Change and Biodiversity: The Next Great
Threat to Biodiversity (2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-09/media
/cop9-press-kit-cc-en.pdf.
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affecting all of our lives,”6 “the worst problem facing the world today,”7 and,
ultimately, “the greatest challenge of our generation.”8 The problem is
global climate change.
In contrast, the response has been weak, dismal even, and recognition of
these governance failings is widespread. The failings are not for want of
general consensus on the seriousness of the issue, or for want of evidence of
the ways in which human-induced climate change will affect humans and
non-humans in the short and long term.9 Nor are they for want of effort on
the part of many, particularly those working through and in support of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).10
At the highest level, recognition of the scale of the problem has prompted
great political consensus—near unanimous consensus—on the need to act.
Most significantly, participation in the UNFCCC is “near-universal,”
with 195 parties having ratified the treaty.11 This means that 195 states,
territories, and regional economic organizations—representing all UN
Member States—agree that “human activities have been substantially in-
creasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these in-
creases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on
average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and
may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind” and, accordingly,
that it is the goal of the Parties pursuant to the treaty to “stabiliz[e] . . .
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”12 On
this, the global community has agreed since 1992.
If every UN Member State is a party to the treaty, what then is the
problem? The problem, simply put, is that the existing global paradigm,
which aligns and consigns climate change within the boundaries of interna-
6. Bryan Walsh, Q&A: The U.N.’s Ban Ki-Moon on Climate Change, TIME, Dec. 11,
2009, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1929071_1929070_194
7173,00.html.
7. Kate Sheppard, Harry Reid: ‘Climate Change Is The Worst Problem Facing The World
Today’, HUFFINGTON POST, March 6, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/06/harry-
reid-climate-change_n_4914683.html.
8. Steve Almasy, John Kerry: Climate Change as Big a Threat as Terrorism, Poverty,
WMDs, CNN, Feb. 17, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/16/politics/kerry-climate/ (quot-
ing John Kerry).
9. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (T.F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013).
10. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html [hereinafter UNFCCC].
11. See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification of the Convention, https://unfccc.int/essential_
background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
12. UNFCCC, supra note 10, at art. 2.
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tional environmental law, is flawed. This Article challenges this paradigm
and argues that climate change is an issue of such scale and complexity that
it defies resolution through the constrained channels of an international
environmental treaty. It is a challenge rooted in our models of development,
capitalism, free trade, and state sovereignty, and we are no more likely to be
able to “solve” it with the tools of international environmental law alone
than we are likely to be able to solve it using any type of linear approach
that ignores the economic and socio-legal realities that shape the field.
Yet, we continue to characterize and approach climate change “just like
any other international environmental problem.”13 In so doing, we constrain
ourselves within the limits of international environmental law.
International environmental law is a field that “has had significant suc-
cess”14 in its short history. And, the continued evolution of international
environmental law is vital to global efforts to identify and respond to shared
problems. Even when confronting less complex dilemmas, however, interna-
tional environmental law, at best, “is part—but only part—of the solution.”15
International environmental law has limits. Limits that we understand.
Limits that allow it to thrive in certain circumstances but doom it to fall
short in other circumstances. Limits that mean that when confronting a
problem that “affects core development issues: poverty, water scarcity, dis-
ease, regional and political instability, global health;”16 that necessitates “a
restructuring of the foundations of modern economies, especially the energy
systems;”17 and, according to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Ban Ki Moon, that “affects the future of humanity, and . . . the future of the
planet Earth,” we have hit those limits.
These limits reveal the degree to which we now exist in a world where
human influence over the planetary system is so pervasive as to create con-
ditions wherein radical instability18 and radical interconnectedness define
13. TIMO KOIVUROVA, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 187 (2012).
14. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16
(2010). Definitions of international environmental law vary with some being primarily de-
scriptive and others being more normative or inentional in nature. As a general matter,
however, international environmental law is generally understood as “encompass[ing] the
entire corpus of international law, public and private, relevant to environmental issues or
problems.” PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE, & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2009).
15. Id.
16. Walsh, supra note 6.
17. KOIVUROVA, supra note 13, at 200.
18. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Becoming Landsick: Rethinking Sustainability in an
Age of Continuous, Visible and Irreversible Change in RETHINKING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TO MEET THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE (Jessica Owley & Keith Hirokawa, eds.) (forthcom-
ing 2015) (arguing to “view constant change as the norm, not as an aberration to be ignored,
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the parameters of our interactions. As a global community, we find our-
selves confronting a problem that defies traditional legal boundaries, that
defies planetary boundaries.19 Running up against legal boundaries, we con-
tinue to operate largely within them. By operating within these legal
boundaries, we run full speed ahead towards our planetary boundaries.
This is a critical moment.20 It is a moment to be as direct as possible in
asking the question: are we facing a situation that requires more than incre-
mental change, more than working with and within what we have? It is the
same question that the global community asked in the late 1960s and 1970s
when confronted with a suite of shared environmental problems and an-
swered with an affirmative and optimistic “yes.”21 Yes, we need new con-
cepts and new tools to deal with an emerging set of issues. We need
transformative change. In this way, international environmental law was
born. And, in its brief history, as Bodansky notes, international environ-
mental law has proved to be “neither a panacea nor a sham”22 but, at best, “a
thirty percent solution.”23 It has proved vital. But it will never be enough
unless we find ways to improve its effectiveness, broaden its reach, and
situate it at the core of international law and policy.
Now, we confront a new set of problems and, specifically, one particu-
larly intractable problem. It is a problem that demands that we buck inertia
and ask—with the same level of optimism, creativity, and determination
that drove us in the early days of environmental law—what can we do to
address more effectively a problem that constitutes something more than the
avoided, or resisted” and that adapting to climate change “is most fundamentally about cop-
ing with continual, and often unpredictable, change.”).
19. For explanations and analysis of the concepts of planetary boundaries, see, e.g.,
Rakhyun E. Kim & Klaus Bosselmann, International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene:
Towards a Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L.
(2013); Will Steffen et al., How Defining Planetary Boundaries Can Transform Our Approach to
Growth 2 SOLUTIONS (2011), available at http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/935; J.
Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 32 (2009); J. Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461
NATURE 472–75 (2009).
20. Or, in memory of Professor Joseph Sax, it is a moment to be opportunistic. See
Douglas Martin, Joseph Sax, Who Pioneered Environmental Law, Dies at 78, NEW YORK TIMES,
March 11, 2014, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/us/joseph-l-sax-
who-pioneered-legal-protections-for-natural-resources-dies-at-78.html?_r=0 (statement of
Joseph Sax) (“I think if you’re going to work on issues like environmental protection, you
have to be opportunistic in the sense that you wait until the time is ripe, and then you can
get some things done.”).
21. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
22. BODANSKY, supra note 14, at 15.
23. Id.
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greatest international environmental law challenge of our time? A problem
that is rooted in global change, for as the growth of the global economy has
brought us closer and closer together, making us more and more dependent
on one another, the lines have become blurred between what we call an
environmental problem and what we call a problem of fundamental human
security, health, and well-being.
Within this starkly defined context, this Article challenges the wisdom
of the dominant paradigm surrounding global efforts to address climate
change. A paradigm in which global climate change negotiations remain
largely confined to the channels of international environmental law. The
central question, to borrow from James Gustave Speth, is “[c]an interna-
tional environmental law deal with the big issues?”24
In unpacking this question, this Article calls for critical thinking about
the role and value of international environmental law in a world increas-
ingly shaped by global climate change. In key part, this Article pushes back
against the dominant framing of global climate change as a problem of and
for international environmental law, narrowly understood. It makes the case
that it is necessary to challenge the existing paradigm in international law
that frames global efforts to address climate change as a problem of and for
international environmental law.
This Article argues that the static nature of the existing global paradigm
brings about two primary harms. First, the failure to address climate change
overshadows the larger field of international environmental law in a way
that inhibits efforts to address a suite of persistent environmental problems
beyond climate change. Second, framing climate change as a traditional en-
vironmental law problem constrains efforts to think more creatively about
how to address a problem that defies classification as an environmental issue
and demands innovative governance approaches.25
This Article challenges the dominant paradigm in an attempt to en-
courage more focused debate on the harms we inflict when we unnecessarily
constrain our framing of the climate change problem. Following this intro-
duction, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly chronicles the
scale of the climate change problem. Part III pushes back against a pervasive
perception that the failures within the global climate change regime reflect
failings and general lethargy within the larger field of international environ-
24. James Gustave Speth, International Environmental Law: Can it Deal With the Big
Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 779 (2004).
25. As Speth characterized it: “[T]he response of the international community has
missed the mark in two key respects. First, it opted for IEL as the primary means of attack
while badly neglecting measures that could more directly correct the underlying drivers of
large-scale deterioration. Second, having selected IEL as the chosen instrument, it never
really gave IEL a chance to succeed.” Id. at 785.
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mental law. Part IV then looks beyond international environmental law to
reveal the extent to which climate change is, but is much more than, a
problem of international environmental law.26 The Article concludes by em-
phasizing that the continuing inability of international environmental law to
“solve” the climate change problem undermines neither the international
environmental law project, nor the climate change project. Stepping back to
view the system critically enables us to use more effectively the tools of
international environmental law to address climate change and the host of
other environmental problems we face.
II. THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM
The evidence is overwhelming and, year-by-year, it continues to accu-
mulate and, in most respects, become more dire.
In 2014, the lead scientific body on climate change—the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—released its Fifth Assessment
Report (AR5).27 This report, which is the most comprehensive report on
climate change compiled to date, warns of the increasing scope and inten-
sity of climate-related effects on human and non-human life absent efforts
both to mitigate and to prepare for climate change. In critical part, AR5
concludes that “[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear”28 and that:
[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the
1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over de-
cades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the
amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and
the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.29 . . . Each
of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the
Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850.30
The earth is already warming; humans are influencing and being af-
fected by this process. Unless we modify our behavior—by reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases substantially—we will experience continued
warming and continued changes in all components of the climate system.
26. See Peter Singer, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2002).
27. INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR5) available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (last visited Oct. 15 2014). More than 830 authors repre-
senting up to 85 countries contributed to this report.
28. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adapta-
tion and Vulnerability, at 12 (March 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/
uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf
29. IPCC (2013), supra note 9, at 4.
30. Id. at 5.
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And, these changes will be significant.31 According to the IPCC, global
surface temperature increases will be between 3.7C and 4.8C in 2100 if no
new action is taken. The temperature increases will be substantial and the
effects on humans will be severe.
Reiterating that the threats are not only real but also happening in real
time, following the release of AR5, in May 2014, the U.S. Global Change
Research Program released the Third National Climate Assessment. This re-
port, which is considered the authoritative and comprehensive report on
climate change and its impacts in the United States, declared that:
“[c]limate change, once considered an issue for a distant future, has moved
firmly into the present.”32 The report gives context to these impacts, noting
that:
Corn producers in Iowa, oyster growers in Washington State, and
maple syrup producers in Vermont are all observing climate-related
changes that are outside of recent experience. So, too, are coastal
planners in Florida, water managers in the arid Southwest, city
dwellers from Phoenix to New York, and Native Peoples on tribal
lands from Louisiana to Alaska. This National Climate Assessment
concludes that the evidence of human-induced climate change con-
tinues to strengthen and that impacts are increasing across the
country.33
The effects are real; they are widespread; they are already present; they
will become more pervasive over time. These are the takeaways of the re-
port. Ultimately, as it cautions, “[t]he observed warming and other climatic
changes are triggering wide-ranging impacts in every region of our country
and throughout our economy.”34 Climate change is not just a problem for
future generations; it is also a problem for present generations. Climate
change is not just a problem for the developing world; it is also a problem
for the United States and every other country in the world. In every context
31. See id. at 20 (According to the IPCC, “[g]lobal surface temperature change for the
end of the 21st century is likely to exceed 1.5°C relative to 1850 to 1900 for all RCP scenarios
except RCP2.6. It is likely to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5, and more likely than not to
exceed 2°C for RCP4.5. Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except
RCP2.6.”).
32. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED




34. Id. at 1.
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and at every level of governance, there is a pressing need “to prepare for and
respond to its far-reaching implications.”35
The AR5 and the Third National Climate Assessment deepen our under-
standing of what we already knew: climate change creates new threats, exac-
erbates existing threats, and exposes and deepens existing vulnerabilities
and social, political, and economical inequalities. It is merciless in its reach
and, absent massive shifts in the way that we consume energy and in the
attention we pay to climate adaptation efforts, the impacts will only become
more severe and pervasive over time.
Scientific consensus creates the imperative to act. Yet, legal and politi-
cal efforts fail to keep pace. Future efforts to address both climate change
and the larger suite of persistent environmental problems require that we
challenge the conventional paradigm to deepen our understanding of oppor-
tunities that exist within and beyond its edges.
III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW BEYOND
CLIMATE CHANGE
The field of international environmental law emerged in response to a
set of issues that predated understanding of the climate problem. As a field
of law, it has evolved both separate to, and in response to global climate
change negotiations. In recent years, however, struggles within the climate
change context have worked to deepen skepticism about the general utility
of international environmental law, while also likely reducing resources and
overshadowing developments within this arena. In order to understand the
role that international environmental law can play in addressing the above-
mentioned suite of persistent environmental problems, we must look more
closely at the internal dynamics of international environmental law, the in-
terplay between climate change and international environmental law, and,
ultimately, the limits of international environmental law as it currently
exists.
A. The Narrative of International Environmental Law
International environmental law is a field or, perhaps, a concept that
elicits varied, but often strong, reactions from those who encounter it.
Many people, even some of those working within the field, see international
environmental law as a stagnant, floundering, or jurisprudentially un-
35. Id. at 2.
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grounded36 area of law37 In one version, the field is both theoretically un-
grounded and largely ineffectual because of its rapid evolution, its
conflicted or even absent normative underpinnings, and its lack of tradi-
tional compliance and enforcement mechanisms. It is a fragmented field in
need of tidying up and redirecting.38 This view predates the epic challenges
and perceived failures of the international community in its ongoing efforts
to combat global climate change, but it has been intensified by them. As
climate change becomes more and more central to the field, and as the
climate change debate continues to focus—at least in significant part—on
the possibilities of state-centered reforms and their persistent failures, the
story of the floundering and failures surrounding international environmen-
tal law deepens.
The focus on climate change both overshadows work on other environ-
mental issues and encourages a deepening sense of frustration about the
possibility of successfully addressing not only climate change, but also other
environmental problems, ranging from mercury pollution, to persistent or-
ganic pollution, to biodiversity protection, to fisheries management, to
marine pollution, to desertification, and beyond.
36. See, e.g., Kim & Bosselmann, supra note 19, at 287 (bemoaning the “absence of a
clearly agreed, unifying goal to which all international regulatory regimes and organizations
are legally bound to contribute.”).
37. See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
15 (2010) (noting that “many take the opposite view, namely, that international environmen-
tal law is simply rhetoric, which does not affect how states behave.”). See also Joel B. Eisen,
From Stockholm to Kyoto and Back to the United States: International Environmental Law’s Effect
on Domestic Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1435, 1438-39 (1999) (describing international environ-
mental law as “a largely sanctionless creation ‘full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.’”)
(quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5). For further analysis of international
environmental law, see, e.g., ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, EFFEC-
TIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER (2006); THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
GIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (Oran R. Young ed., 1999); THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998). For a
discussion of these issues in the context of domestic environmental law, see generally A. Dan
Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213
(2004). See also Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 63, 68 (2003) (noting that the “superficiality and inadequacy of our knowledge of the
values embedded in these laws becomes still more apparent when we ask why we care about
the environment.”).
38. See, e.g., Frank Biermann et al., The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures:
A Framework for Analysis, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 14, 17 (2009); Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne, Good
Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law Away?, 30 LAW & POL’Y
450, 469 (2008); Sebastian Oberthür & Thomas Gehring, Conceptual Foundations of Institu-
tional Interaction, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY
AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES 19 (Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthür eds., 2006).
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In many ways, there is a sense that the field is stuck. Yet, even in the
shadow of this perception, environmental law has been evolving. Behind the
climate shadow, work has continued in traditional39 and non-traditional
ways.40 In spite of this continuing work, the field and those working within
the field—as scholars, policy makers, and activists—struggle against the
weight of the inertia that they confront at critical points. This is especially
true as international environmental law becomes—rightly or wrongly—more
and more synonymous with climate change and the struggles of the climate
change regime.
The common narrative of international environmental law, however,
does not do justice to the ways in which international environmental law has
evolved, the many and complex ways in which it operates, and the potential
that exists to make it work even more effectively moving forward. This is
because, as is evident upon closer look, international environmental law is
not, and cannot be just that. It is not just law or, more accurately, not just
39. See, e.g., Minamata Convention on Mercury, Oct. 10, 2013, available at http://
www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/conventionText/Minamata%20Conven
tion%20on%20Mercury_e.pdf; Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. Intervening),
Judgment (Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf;
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, Oct.
18–29, 2010, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Annex I (Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol]; Tseming Yang &
Robert Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 645–49
(2009) (describing the growth of international environmental law, including the application
of traditional legal instruments to global environmental problems). See also Andrew Schatz et
al., International Environmental Law, 47 INT’L LAW. 435, 438–39 (2013) (discussing progress
under the umbrella of the Montreal Protocol to speed up the phase-out of hydrofluoro-
carbons and potent GHGs used as alternatives to ozone-depleting substances).
40. There are an increasing number of non-legal instruments, such as private standards
and principles, being used to address issues of international environmental importance. See,
e.g., Evisa Kica & Diana M. Bowman, Regulation by Means of Standardization: Key Legitimacy
Issues of Health and Safety Nanotechnology Standards, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 11, 19 (2012); THE EQUA-
TOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); Kirsten
Mikadze, Public Participation in Global Environmental Governance and the Equator Principles:
Potential and Pitfalls, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1383, 1387 (2012) (describing the Equator Principles as
“a voluntary code initially launched in 2003 by several large international banks and revised
in 2006 (with a further revised version, after numerous delays, on track for finalization and
release in October 2012). Adopters of the EPs—all large, globally facing financial institu-
tions—pledge to adhere to a framework of environmental and social assessment in their pro-
ject financing activities. They build upon the Performance Standards for Social and
Environmental Sustainability created by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and
upon the World Bank’s Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines. The EPs apply to
projects of $10 million or more. The adopters—referred to as Equator Principles Financial
Institutions (EPFI)—commit to providing finance only when the conditions embodied in ten
principles are met.”).
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public international law.41 It never has been. It is also not just international,
at least as traditionally understood. It is global42 and regional and transna-
tional43 and much more. And, finally, international environmental law is
also not just “environmental”. That is, the issues that it struggles to address
no longer comfortably wear the narrow label of “environmental issues”.
41. Notions of global environmental governance capture the shortcoming in the
description of international environmental law. Global environmental governance has been
variously defined as “the attempt by an international network of organizations to moderate
and minimize the damage done to the environment by human societies” and “a ‘political
reform programme’ aimed at achieving ‘more effective global regimes and organizations’ and
defined by politics that involve nonstate actors, the rise of new forms of institutions, and the
rise of different layers of rule-making and rule-implementation.” Melissa Dorn, Summary of
the Conference on Global Environmental Governance, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 305
(2007); International Environmental Law-Making and the International Court of Justice, Remarks
by Ronald J. Bettauer, 105 AM . SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 61, 64 (2001) (quoting Frank Biermann,
Bernd Siebenhüner & Anna Schreyögg, Global Environmental Governance and International
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 2 (Frank
Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner & Anna Schreyögg eds., 2009)).
42. There is an emerging body of law that describes the larger field as the field of
global environmental law. See, e.g., Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 616–17 (defining global
environmental law as “the set of legal principles developed by national, international, and
transnational environmental regulatory systems to protect the environment and manage nat-
ural resources. As a body of law, it is made up of a distinct set of substantive principles and
procedural methods that are specifically important or unique to governance of the environ-
ment across the world. It includes: (1) public international environmental law, commonly
used to refer to the set of treaties and customary international legal principles governing the
relations between nations; (2) national environmental law, which describes the principles
used by national governments to regulate the behavior of private individuals, organizations,
and subnational governmental entities within their borders; and (3) transnational law, which
describes the set of legal principles used to regulate the cross-border relationships between
private individuals and organizations.”).
43. The emerging field of transnational environmental law views the many ways in
which global, regional, and national systems of environmental law and policy evolve and
interact. See, e.g., Cinnamon Carlarne & Daniel Farber, Law Beyond Borders: Transnational
Responses to Global Environmental Issues, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 13 (2012) (describing transna-
tional environmental law as a “way of looking at environmental law as an interconnected and
interactive global network in response to interconnected, and often global, challenges.”). See
also Gregory Schaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnational Unilateralism and International Law,
1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31, 32 (2012) (defining transnational environmental law as “much
broader than that of international environmental law. Transnational environmental law en-
compasses all environmental law norms that apply to transboundary activities or that have
effects in more than one jurisdiction . . . . The concept of transnational environmental law
thus includes national environmental regulation that has horizontal effects across jurisdic-
tions-for example, by providing regulatory models to other countries or by applying to or
affecting the behavior of producers and consumers within them. It also includes the develop-
ment of standards by private actors that have effects across borders, such as through product
certification and labeling regimes. In practice, the transnational environmental law process
sometimes includes international law as part of a single diachronic law-making process, but
oftentimes does not.”).
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They are that, but they are not just that: they are big economic issues;44 big
health issues;45 big human rights issues;46 big human issues.
When we characterize climate change as an environmental issue to be
dealt with using the traditional tools of environmental law, we constrain our
decision makers. Climate change is a problem firmly rooted in our basic
post-war global economic model, a model that is based on an underlying
assumption that free trade and economic growth can simultaneously im-
prove global economic welfare and address distributive justice concerns.
The flaws of this model are widely recognized,47 yet it remains largely in-
tact and healthy economic relations constitute the pillar around which most
global negotiations revolve. Thus, while we recognize climate change as a
problem that emerges from and in every important way implicates the dom-
inant economic model, we continue to direct policymaker to frame climate
change as a traditional environmental problem to be addressed in a way that
does not interfere too much with this model.48
Recognizing the existence of this framing and the general parameters of
the system allows a more frank discussion about international environmen-
tal law and, ultimately, about climate change law.
44. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2008); Cinnamon Carlarne, Risky Business: The Ups and Downs of Mixing Economics, Security
and Climate Change, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 439 (2009); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007); Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change: A
Challenge to Policy, in ECONOMIST’S VOICE (June 2007).
45. See, e.g., Michael Depledge & Cinnamon Carlarne, Sick of the Weather: Climate
Change, Human Health and International Law, Opinion Piece, 9 ENVTL. L. REV. 231 (2007).
46. See, e.g., John H. Knox, Human Rights Principles and Climate Change, in THE Oxford
Handbook of International Climate Change Law (forthcoming 2015) (copy on file with
author).
47. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldham-
mer trans.) (2014).
48. See, e.g., KOIVUROVA, supra note 13, at 206 (noting that “[c]ontaining climate change
will require intervention with the basics of modern economies: first and foremost, a radical
reduction in the use of all fossil fuels.”). See also Richard H. Steinberg, Power and Cooperation
in International Environmental Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
511-23 (2007) (providing a discussion of the ways in which multilateral environmental agree-
ments use trade-related tools - i.e., traditional economic tools – but do so tentatively in the
shadow of international trade law, and often without clearly settled answers as to the validity
of trade related environmental measures, noting, in key part, that “GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system has never fully condoned a challenged trade restriction aimed at ex-
trajurisdictional environmental activity.”).
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B. The Double Negative of the International Environmental
Law Frame
The story of international environmental law is a complex one; interna-
tional environmental law has struggled since its inception to find workable
solutions to complex problems. As our understanding of the problems has
evolved, the thinking has become more creative but also more constrained
by, on one hand, bureaucracy and, on the other hand, political apathy on the
part of key players. This is not an Article that sees or even seeks the seeds
of epic revival of international environmental law writ large. At the global
level, our environmental “problems are more deeply entrenched”49 and more
pervasive than ever. No one disputes that. Yet, it is also not an Article that
seeks to depict the international environmental law project as anything less
than what it is, which is a project that is dynamic, evolving, and essential.
Fundamentally, this is a conversation about rediscovering international
environmental law not just as more than traditional Westphalian, state-cen-
tric international law,50 which it is now widely recognized to be, but also as
a field in crisis. It is a field in crisis because the problems it confronts are
far more than environmental problems and require responses far eclipsing
those available using traditional or even novel tools of environmental law. It
is also about recognizing that, while efforts to improve the internal func-
tioning of international environmental law are vital and must continue,51
there is a parallel and urgent need to push the efforts beyond the borders of
international environmental law.
At its roots, much of environmental law—whether domestic or interna-
tional—involves finding ways to internalize the negative externalities of
human behavior. However, we have reached a point where the externalities
49. Speth, supra note 24, at 780.
50. See, e.g., Cinnamon Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework: Adaptation and the
Future of the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012).
51. For just a sampling of the good work being done in this area, see Edith Brown
Weiss, Legacies of Louis B. Sohn: The United Nations Charter and International Environmental
Law, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 212-24 (2008); Maria Ivanova, Yale Ctr. for
Envtl. Law and Pol., Can the Anchor Hold?: Rethinking the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme for the 21st Century, 37-38 (Yale School of Forestry & Envtl. Studies 2005); FRANK
BIERMANN ET AL., A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR EFFECTIVE INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann & Steffen Bauer eds., 2005); David
Driesen, Thirty Years of International Environmental Law: A Retrospective and Plea for Reinvigo-
ration, 30 SYRACUSE J. OF INT’L L. & COM ., 353 (2003); Daniel C. Esty & Maria Ivanova,
Toward a Global Environmental Mechanism in WORLDS APART: GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (James G. Speth ed., 2003); Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2002); Daniel C. Esty, International Governance at the Global Level:
The Value of Creating a Global Environmental Organization, in ENVIRONMENT MATTERS ANNUAL
REVIEW: 1999-2000 12 (World Bank ed., 2000).
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of human actions, particularly energy consumption, are too great to be in-
ternalized within the domain of environmental law. As a result, these criti-
cal problems—particularly climate change—can no longer be relegated to a
set of actors and institutions fundamentally incapable of either offering ef-
fective responses on their own, or of garnering the political will that is
essential to do so based on a traditional framing of the problems.
A decade ago, back when we were still at least marginally optimistic
about climate change, Speth posed the question that animates this arti-
cle: ”[c]an international environmental law deal with the big issues?”52 Our
subsequent experiences in the climate context suggest that no, it cannot.
But, more importantly, our experiences with the climate change regime
reveal that the current big issues that international environmental law con-
fronts do not rest comfortably within the parameters of any one legal field.
It should therefore be no surprise that international environmental law can-
not deal with the big issues, when the big issues include problems such as
climate change, global biodiversity loss, food security, and desertification.
Perhaps, in its youth, international environmental law was capable of
dealing with what were then big environmental issues, for example, ocean
dumping, whaling (as the issue evolved into an environmental one), and
even ozone depletion. These were big issues that, for all practical purposes,
sat comfortably within the field of international environmental law and
were distinct enough to be dealt with by a discrete body of law.
But, today the big issues that international environmental law confronts
are just that—big global issues. They sit squarely within and in important
ways implicate questions of environmental law, as traditionally understood.
However, in both cause and consequence, they also implicate areas of law
and policy far removed from the traditional environmental space.
Climate change is certainly the easiest example of this imperfect fit.
One cannot talk about climate change without talking about free trade,
about energy choices, about humanitarian law, or human rights law, or intel-
lectual property law.53
We know this all too well. Yet, both within and beyond the field, when
we ask ourselves: can international environmental law deal with the big issues?;
can international environmental law solve the climate problem? This framing
achieves the dual harm of undermining the legitimacy of the larger field of
international environmental law and impairing our ability to find more ef-
52. Speth, supra note 24, at 779.
53. Equally, within environmental law circles, we are all well aware that efforts to
protect global biodiversity are intricately linked with our successes and failures in the climate
change context—both in relation to mitigation and adaptation. But, so too, is the future of
global biodiversity linked to patterns of economic development, trade law, intellectual prop-
erty law, corporate law and more.
16 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:1
fective responses to very big, very pressing global problems central among
which is climate change.
The initial framing of climate change as an environmental issue was
expected and made sense. This framing spurred an extensive base of policy-
makers, scientists, and activists into identifying the contours of the problem
and mobilizing political action around the problem. Accepting this static
framing in perpetuity, however, limits efforts moving forward.
Yet there has been a persistent hesitancy to push too hard for a refram-
ing of the key questions or for a deeper integration of these questions
within other political discussions and legal regimes. There has not been a
concerted effort to push for other more politically relevant and powerful
institutions to pose a reframed version of the core question.54 For example:
can trade law deal with the big issues? If that question was asked, those big
issues would include climate change and the question, similarly, would be
answered: no. These legal institutions were not designed to address these
larger questions.
It is, therefore, no surprise that, when asked a much smaller version of
the question involving the interaction between multilateral environmental
agreements and trade agreements, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
deflects the question or refers it elsewhere. For example, when addressing
questions of the compatibility between trade and the environment back in
2001, even before climate change became a dominant concern, former Di-
rector General of the WTO, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, advocated the cre-
ation of a World Environment Organization, noting that the WTO lacks
the capacity to “align the agreements on environmental protection and trade
agreement[s] without having another organization that would be able to po-
lice, to referee, to make it rational and to make doing so acceptable for a
rules-based organization like the WTO.”55
Dr. Panitchpakdi is not alone in trying to avoid dealing with nominally
environmental issues within a trade-based organization. More recently, a
2009 publication jointly authored by the WTO and the United Nations
54. An exception to this was the effort in 2007, led by the United Kingdom, to en-
courage the UN Security Council to address climate change as a security issue. See Perma-
nent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Letter dated Apr.
5, 2007 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2007/186 (Apr. 5, 2007); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds
First Ever Debate on the Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing over 50
Speakers, U.N. Press Release SC/9000 (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm. See also Risky Business, supra note 44, at 461.
55. Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the New Millen-
nium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 446 (2001).
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Environment Programme (UNEP) noted that while “trade intersects with
climate change in a multitude of ways,” a “multilateral agreement with bind-
ing commitments establishing the framework for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions for post-2012 and beyond should be the main instrument for ad-
dressing climate change.”56 This position represents the dominant view
that, despite well-recognized issue intersections, neither the WTO nor its
legal counterparts in other areas of law should bear the responsibility for
addressing far-reaching environment issues such as climate change.57
It is to be expected, then, when we see the WTO’s official position on
climate change framed thusly: “measures to address climate change need to
be fully compatible with the international community’s wider ambitions for
economic growth and human advancement.”58 This framing aptly illustrates
the larger problem. It is not that anyone truly advocates that climate change
should be dealt with exclusively, or even primarily, by the WTO. This is
neither feasible nor desirable. It is that climate change continues to be
framed as a cabined issue; an issue to be dealt with through the institutions
of international environmental law using tools that do not conflict with
other areas of international law; an issue to be addressed second to wider
interests in growth and advancement. This framing belies all of the evi-
dence that we now have that suggests that climate change is intrinsically
bound up in, and inseparable from wider interests, whether those wider
interests are—as the WTO suggests—economic growth, or whether they are
human health or equity, as other key international institutions might pro-
pose. As Boyle and Singh note in reference to the relationship between
trade and climate:
If trade is part of the problem, then alterations to the WTO trade
regime may also have to be part of the answer. Climate change
policy cannot be implemented through the UNFCCC alone but
requires co-ordination of policies and measures by a range of inter-
national institutions inside and outside the UN system.59
56. Ludivine Tamiotti et al., United Nations Environment Programme & the World
Trade Organization, Report, Trade and Climate Change (2009), available at http://www.wto
.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Duncan Brack, Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM
321, 341–49 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2d ed. 2002).
58. WTO, The Multilateral Trading System and Climate Change: Introduction, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_intro_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (em-
phasis added).
59. Alan Boyle & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Climate Change and International Law Beyond
the UNFCCC, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (Cinnamon
Carlarne, Richard Tarasofsky, & Kevin Gray eds., forthcoming 2015) (further noting that
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Yet the dominant framing continues largely to ignore the reality that
climate change is embedded within all these fields and in constant interac-
tion with them.60
Even as we deepen understanding of the many and varied ways in
which the causes and consequences of climate change overlap with, for ex-
ample—questions of trade, human rights,61 humanitarian law, intellectual
property,62 and security law—the walls between these disciplines remain
firmly in place. Climate change remains largely outside of these walls and
relegated to the processes of international environmental law despite the
fact that the existing process is increasingly seen as flawed, if not failing.63
This fragmentation is neither unexpected nor legally reprehensible.
This is how international law works. It is an essential but idealized system
that often conceptualizes and treats issues in isolation. It is a system that
lacks the capacity to depict and respond to the ways in which climate
change, alongside other issues of international importance, involves a “con-
stant process of conflict and interaction”64 between seemingly distinct sys-
tems, both natural and human. These other international institutions were
not designed with climate change in mind; they are guided by and con-
strained by member state-approved missions that may not (and, often, do
not) include a mandate to address climate change.
And, so the frame persists and the double negative persists: we under-
mine the evolving field of international environmental law by conflating it
with the struggles of the climate change regime, and we undermine global
stability by delaying more dynamic efforts to address climate change at
every level of governance.
“[t]he difficulty of ensuring coherence among competing bureaucratic mandates should
neither be underestimated, nor overstated.”).
60. Cf. Sean Sayers, On the Marxist Dialectic, 14 RADICAL PHIL. 9, 10 (1976) (stating “[a]ll
real, concrete things are part of the world of interaction, motion and change; and for them
we must recognize that things are not merely self-subsistent, but exist essentially in relation
to other things.”).
61. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 46.
62. See, e.g., Joshua Sarnoff, Intellectual Property and Climate Change, with an Emphasis on
Patents and Technology Transfer, in THE Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change
Law (forthcoming 2015) (copy on file with author).
63. See, e.g., HARRO VAN ASSELT, THE FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE:
CONSEQUENCES AND MANAGEMENT OF REGIME INTERACTIONS 244-73 (2014) (noting the “promises
and pitfalls” of the fragmentation in the global climate change governance); Carlarne, Re-
thinking a Failing Framework, supra note 50, at 4.
64. Sayers, supra note 60, at 12.
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C. Taking on the Double Negative: The Inherent Value of
International Environmental Law
Behind the climate shadow, the conversations that are taking place on
questions of international environmental law and larger systems of global
environmental governance reflect ongoing and inevitable struggles within
the field.65 The struggles within the field of international environmental
law are real. It would be unhelpful to deflect or deny that there are
problems that are internal to the field and central to its ability to function
effectively.
One need only look at the constant quagmire surrounding UNEP and
the global environmental governance66 and sustainability debates,67 or the
inefficiencies and insular politics among and between the secretariats to the
multilateral environmental agreements, or the continuing deliberations
about compliance with international obligations68 to understand how, even
65. See, e.g., Mikadze, supra note 40, at 1383 (noting that “[d]espite the increasing
urgency of global environmental issues, international environmental law continues to strug-
gle for relevancy and effectiveness.”).
66. Defined variously as “the attempt by an international network of organizations to
moderate and minimize the damage done to the environment by human societies,” Melissa
Dorn, Summary of the Conference on Global Environmental Governance, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 303, 305 (2007), and a “ ‘political reform programme’ aimed at achieving ‘more effec-
tive global regimes and organizations’ and defined by politics that involve nonstate actors,
the rise of new forms of institutions, and the rise of different layers of rule-making and rule-
implementation.’” Ronald J. Bettauer, Remarks, International Environmental Law-Making and
the International Court of Justice, 105 AM . SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 61, 64 (2001) (quoting Frank
Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner & Anna Schreyögg, Global Environmental Governance and In-
ternational Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERN-
ANCE 2 (Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner & Anna Schreyögg eds. 2009)).
67. See, e.g., Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network,
An Action Agenda for Sustainable Development: Report to the U.N. Secretary General
(June 6, 2013), available at http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/140505-An-Ac-
tion-Agenda-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf.
68. See, e.g., David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior or
Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 101, 144-45 (2013) (noting that a “[l]ack of
enforcement remains the largest issue as countries are unwilling to give up their sovereignty
or economic advantages.”). For further discussion on questions of compliance and enforce-
ment in international environmental law, see generally Jutta Brunnée, Enforcement Mechanisms
in International Law and International Environmental Law, 1 ENVTL. L. NETWORK INT’L REV. 1
(2005); EDWARD MILES ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS: CONFRONTING THEORY WITH
EVIDENCE (2002); ORAN YOUNG, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (1999); ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds., 1998); THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998); Thomas
Bernauer, The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More, 49
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with problems internal to the field, there is ample room for improvement.69
As Anton notes, it is “only in a very few instances, such as environmentally
safe ship construction requirements and limits on production and consump-
tion of ozone depleting substances, that the law has had a major salutary
impact on environmental problems.”70 The clear and visible victories of in-
ternational environmental law are few. Moreover, we are operating within a
context with “almost universally and continually declining global environ-
mental indicators,” which “present[s] a host of disturbing existential pros-
pects for generations in being and, even more so, for posterity to follow.”71
Put another way, “environmental regulation strategies of all kinds have
failed to keep pace with the rapid evolution of technologies, products, and
markets presenting a new generation of environmental challenges.”72
This combination of deteriorating environmental indicators and rela-
tively few resounding victories creates a difficult environment within which
to continue efforts to address even long-standing environmental challenges,
such as marine dumping, trade in endangered species, or fisheries manage-
ment. It makes it even more difficult to tackle new, more complex issues
such as how to control the presence of persistent organic pollutants in the
environment,73 or how to regulate the still poorly understood risks associ-
ated with nanotechnology,74 or, of course, how to address global climate
change. In fact, as one commentator has noted, “the world’s ever-rising
INT’L ORG. 351 (1995); Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on
the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 123, 123 (1992).
69. See, e.g., Frank Biermann, The Case for a World Environment Organization, 42 ENV’T
22, 28-29 (2000); William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457 (2010);
Karen Morrow, Rio+20, the Green Economy and Re-orienting Sustainable Development, 14 ENVTL.
L.R. 279, 294 (2012); Philippe Le Prestre & Benoit Martimort-Asso, Issues Raised by the
International Environmental Governance System (Institut du Développement Durable et des Rela-
tions Internationales), Global Governance, (Paper No. 12, 2004), available at http://
www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/id_0412bis_bma%26leprestre_
IEG-failures_eng.pdf; Fred Pearce, Beyond Rio, Green Economics Can Give Us Hope, THE
GUARDIAN, June 28, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/28/
rio-green-economics-hope.
70. Donald K. Anton, The “Thirty-Percent Solution” and the Future of International Envi-
ronmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 2, 212 (2013).
71. Id. at 211.
72. Sanford Gaines, Reimagining Environmental Law for the 21st Century, 44 ENVTL. L.
REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10188, 10197 (2014).
73. See Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256
U.N.T.S. 119.
74. For good discussions of the regulatory challenges surrounding nanotechnology, see
Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance Bonding, and Symmetric
Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201 (2010); David. A. Strifling, Environmental Feder-
alism and the Effective Regulation of Nanotechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1129 (2010).
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emissions of greenhouse gases reveal the inadequacy of both traditional and
market-based strategies in the face of relentless population growth, eco-
nomic expansion, and rising energy consumption.”75
The picture is grim, but the gloom should not mask the swift develop-
ment that has taken place within the field of international environmental
law. This rapid development—flaws and all—has been critical to containing
environmental degradation. As bad as it is, it could be much worse.
International environmental law grew up side-by-side with the rapid
growth of the global economy and the concomitant growth in consumption,
with all the negative externalities—environmental and otherwise—that ex-
ponentially increased consumption entailed. International environmental
law, in common with domestic environmental law, has never had the luxury
of mapping out the field and developing a comprehensive strategy for ad-
dressing environmental problems in a pre-crisis, joined-up, and efficient
way. Rather, international environmental law arose out of an immediate
need to address pre-existing and rapidly worsening environmental degrada-
tion, and has been on the run ever since as existing problems deepened and
new problems emerged.
Thus, while the processes of global change proceeded apace from the
1960s onward, so too did the development of international environmental
law. According to one study, states have negotiated more than 1100 multi-
lateral, 1500 bilateral, and 250 “other” environmental treaties, with the vast
majority of these being negotiated since 1960.76 As Anton chronicles in
greater detail:
By the early 1990s, it was estimated that 885 different international
environmental legal instruments (hard and soft) and 139 different
major international environmental treaties were in existence. In the
years between 1972 and 1992 alone, it was said that more than 50
multilateral treaties relating to the protection of the marine envi-
ronment were concluded. In the years between 1970 and 2004,
three hundred and forty-eight multilateral treaties and one hundred
and forty nine protocols were concluded, an average of roughly 100
combined instruments every five years until 2005.77
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Ronald B. Mitchell, International Environmental Agreements Database Pro-
ject, UNIV. OF OR., http://iea.uoregon.edu (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
77. Anton, supra note 70, at 213-14.
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These instruments embody a variety of regulatory approaches and re-
flect an evolving set of authoritative, if not fully agreed upon, environmen-
tal norms.78 As Anton suggests:
[l]ooking back now, the rapid growth of international environmen-
tal conventional norms that took place over roughly the last thirty
years of the twentieth century is striking. Few fields have burst on
the scene with as much unplanned fecundity.79
‘Unplanned fecundity’ aptly characterizes the highs and lows of the
emergence of international environmental law. It grew from a tiny seed to a
tangled garden in a short period of time. The garden, while impressive, is
poorly laid out, lacks organization, and is walled-in. Yet it grows and it
offers plenty of reapable goods. To make it more productive, the garden
needs tidying. Even with the best gardener at the helm, however, the gar-
den will never produce enough of the right type of food to feed us all.
Thus, we confront a dual challenge. The first part of the challenge is to
re-envision international environmental law as a dynamic field80 that is
buoyed, but not constrained, by pre-existing tools. The second part of the
challenge is to recognize that, no matter how dynamic the field of interna-
tional environmental law is or how dynamic the people are who work within
this field, it is constrained in ways—both institutional and political—that
require a rethinking of how we frame questions that emerge from, but ex-
tend beyond categorization as “environmental”.
As an initial step, it is essential to recognize that, although imperfect,
we have and continue to accomplish much through the primary vehicle of
78. As Bodansky points out, the term norm “has a double meaning, one descriptive and
the other prescriptive. . . . In speaking of international environmental “norms,” we are using
the term in its prescriptive rather than its descriptive sense.” BODANSKY, supra note 14, at 87.
79. Anton, supra note 70, at 212. For a detailed discussion of the post 1960s develop-
ment of domestic environmental law in the United States and other developed countries, see
Gaines, supra note 72, at 10192-97.
80. For efforts to re-envision international environmental law, see, e.g., Karen Scott,
International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 309, 313 (2013) (noting that “[t]he term—international environmental law—is com-
monly used as shorthand to refer to the treaties, customs, and principles applied in the
context of environmental protection and conservation . . . .However, this Article will argue
that international environmental law not only refers to an area of international regulation,
but also comprises a distinct set of norms and principles applicable to states in a situation
where the global environment is at risk of serious or irreversible harm.” Id. Scott further
suggests that “no longer merely the descriptor of a substantive area of international regula-
tion, international environmental law can be said to consist of the norms and principles
generally applicable to activities that pose a risk of significant harm to the transboundary or
commons environment.” Id. at 357. See also Yang & Percival, supra note 39.
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international environmental law, multilateral environmental agreements.81
That good is not always discreetly or exclusively legal, although it some-
times is. It includes using traditional tools of law to reduce ozone-depleting
substances,82 to bring whales back from the brink of extinction,83 to adjudi-
cate ongoing disputes about alleged violations of the International Conven-
tion on the Regulation of Whaling,84 to curb interstate trade in endangered
species,85 to begin addressing the mercury problem,86 and to answer ques-
tions about the obligation of sovereign states to conduct environmental im-
pact assessments.87 It also includes identifying emerging environmental
problems88 and prompting the creation of new domestic systems of environ-
mental law and regional environmental partnerships. It includes facilitating
the creation of new networks of civil society actors.89 It includes prompting
81. As Yang and Percival note, multilateral environmental agreements “have been suc-
cessful in promoting harmonization and coordination of environmental norms among nations
and enhancing the integration of national regulatory norms into transnational regimes.” Yang
& Percival, supra note 39, at 628.
82. See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). For discussion of the success of
the Montreal Protocol, see, e.g., Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of
Modern International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 601 (describing how, in addition to
its successes in the ozone context, the Montreal Protocol has become “the most successful
climate change regime in existence” due to recent and ongoing efforts “to control ozone-
depleting substances with climate effects”); U.N. Env’t Programme, A Success in the Making:
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 11 (2008), http://
ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_A_Success_in_the_making-E.pdf.
83. See generally Wil Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the Future of
Cetaceans: Problems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31 (1997); Cinnamon
Piñon Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent
Development, and the Future of the International Whaling Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005).
84. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. V. Japan: N.Z. Intervening), Judgment (Mar.
31, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf.
85. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 48, at 518-19.
86. See, e.g., Tseming Yang, The Minamata Convention on Mercury and the Future of
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2509589.
87. See, e.g., Donald K. Anton, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argen-
tina V. Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep (20 April 2010), 17 AUSTRALIAN INT’L L.J. 213
(2010).
88. For example, the evolving governance debate in the context of geoengineering. See
generally CLIMATE CHANGE GEOENGINEERING? PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, LEGAL ISSUES, AND
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS (Wil Burns & Andrew L. Strauss, eds. 2013); Scott, supra note 80;
Cinnamon Carlarne, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering Wishes, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602
(2011).
89. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds.,
2007); Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Disclo-
sure Approach, 8 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 377 (2008); LINDA A. MALONE & SCOTT PASTERNACK, DE-
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the creation of new programs such as Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD),90 and new private codes such as the
Equator Principles91 that emerge from, but operate beyond, legal institu-
tions and are becoming increasingly important in influencing behavior at
every level of governance. It includes pushing environmental questions into
other legal forums. It includes empowering people to identify environmen-
tal inadequacies and environmental injustices. It includes all of this and
more. Moving forward, it is important to build upon existing successes
while continuing to push efforts within the field further.
Reflecting the push to shift the parameters of dialogue in ways that
reflect and support the dynamic ways in which international environmental
law is evolving, there are vibrant debates about both the framing of the field
and the normative foundations of the field. Each is considered in turn.
1. Reframing the Field
In the first instance, there is growing recognition of, and pushback
against the constraints that the “international environmental law” label im-
poses. This framing of the field is rooted in well-established notions of the
primacy of the state and traditional modes of lawmaking. Yet, this label fails
to adequately encapsulate a more pluralistic vision92 of the ways in which
international environmental issues are governed. Consequently, scholars in-
creasingly refer to actions within this space as falling under the heading of
“global environmental law,” or “transnational environmental law,” or, even
more broadly, “global environmental governance.”
Global environmental law is a term that has picked up currency as a
framing mechanism for encapsulating the intersections between traditional
FENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGIES TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (2004); Kal Raustiala, The Participatory Revolution in International Environmental Law, 21
HARVARD ENVTL. L.R. 537 (1997).
90. See, e.g., David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 717 (2013); William Boyd, Climate
Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-
Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 517-43 (2011); CHARLIE PARKER ET AL., THE
LITTLE REDD+ BOOK: A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL PROPOSALS FOR
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (2008), available at http://
www.amazonconservation.org/pdf/redd_the_little_redd_book_dec_08.pdf.
91. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Nov. 6,
2014); see also Mikadze, supra note 40, at 1387; Douglas Sarro, Do Lenders Make Effective
Regulators? An Assessment of the Equator Principles on Project Finance, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1522
(2012).
92. For further discussion of legal pluralism in international law, see Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S.C. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, From
International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANAT’L L. 485 (2005).
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systems of public international environmental law, transnational systems of
environmental law, and domestic systems of environmental law.93 Growing
acceptance of the notion of global environmental law offers a construct for
conceptualizing the interactions between traditional and novel systems of
environmental law and policy. In large part, global environmental law is a
descriptive tool. As two of its leading proponents characterize it:
Global environmental law is the set of legal principles developed by
national, international, and transnational environmental regulatory
systems to protect the environment and manage natural resources.
As a body of law, it is made up of a distinct set of substantive
principles and procedural methods that are specifically important
or unique to governance of the environment across the world. It
includes: (1) public international environmental law, commonly
used to refer to the set of treaties and customary international legal
principles governing the relations between nations; (2) national en-
vironmental law, which describes the principles used by national
governments to regulate the behavior of private individuals, organi-
zations, and subnational governmental entities within their borders;
and (3) transnational law, which describes the set of legal principles
used to regulate the cross-border relationships between private in-
dividuals and organizations.94
In other words, using the term global environmental law allows us to
conceptualize and, thus, more directly enable “a field of law that is interna-
tional, national, and transnational in character all at once.”95
Similarly, there is a growing body of literature that seeks to understand
environmental issues within a transnational context, approaching the field
as one involving questions of transnational environmental law. Transna-
tional environmental law provides a “way of looking at environmental law as
an interconnected and interactive global network in response to intercon-
nected, and often global, challenges.”96 In this way, as Takacs describes it in
the context of REDD+, “it extends beyond the traditional purview of inter-
national environmental law (comprised of treaties, customary and general
principles of international law, and the work of jurists) to include domestic
legislation that has influence across national boundaries and (as in the in-
stant case) private standards that operate at multiple levels.”97 In common
93. Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 616.
94. Id. at 616-17.
95. Id.
96. Carlarne & Farber, supra note 43, at 13.
97. Takacs, supra note 90, at 717-18.
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with global environmental law, transnational environmental law is under-
stood as being broader and more inclusive than international environmental
law; it includes and takes account of international environmental law while
extending beyond it to understand the relationship between national envi-
ronmental law, regional environmental law, private environmental codes,
and more.98
The relationship between global environmental law and transnational
environmental law has not yet been adequately explored but, at least as
understood by some, global environmental law is a broader, more inclusive
label that includes transnational environmental law under its umbrella.99
Beyond the emergence of more recent concepts of global environmental
law and transnational environmental law, there are long-standing efforts to
view the policy space as one more fittingly understood as occupied by an
emerging system of global environmental governance. Global environmental
governance refers to a “ ‘political reform programme’ aimed at achieving
‘more effective global regimes and organizations’ and defined by politics
that involve nonstate actors, the rise of new forms of institutions, and the
rise of different layers of rule-making and rule-implementation.”100 The
general theory behind global environmental governance is that governance
encompasses but also reaches beyond the boundaries of law. The concept of
global environmental governance includes the processes, institutions, and
outcomes of international environmental law, as well as the peripheral pub-
lic, private, and intergovernmental activities that shape and support interna-
tional law-making processes.101 In this way, the concept of global
environmental governance reflects the realities of the international system,
where law is a fundamental, but nevertheless, component part of a larger
system that creates the parameters of international relations and interna-
tional rules, regulations—both soft and hard102—as well as norms and codes
that influence behavior in relation to environmental issues.
These concepts—global environmental law, transnational environmental
law, and global environmental governance—have emerged along parallel
tracks and there is a need for greater understanding of the ways in which
98. See e.g., Schaffer & Bodansky, supra note 43, at 32.
99. See Tsemina Yang, The Emerging Practice of Global Environmental Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L
ENVTL. L. (2012).
100. Remarks by Bettauer, supra note 41, at 64; see also Dorn, supra note 41, at 305.
101. Carlarne, supra note 38, at 454.
102. See BODANSKY, supra note 14, at 99-100 (discussing the differences—real and per-
ceived—between “soft law” and “hard law” within the context of international environmental
law); see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT’L L. 420 (1991), for further discussions of the meaning and role of soft law in
international environmental law.
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the concepts intersect and overlap. Of importance here, they all share a
common goal of reflecting the impact on the space of environmental law
and policy of a broader set of actors, processes, issues, and institutions
across multiple levels of governance. The vibrant thinking in this area also
reveals how, despite undeniable institutional setbacks and an ever-ex-
panding suite of seemingly intractable problems, efforts abound to use both
old and new tools to better understand and address these challenges.
It is too early to tell whether one or more of these concepts will stick
and what the stakes of resulting conceptual rifts might be. Nevertheless, it
is evident that the emergence of these concepts reflects a desire to find new,
more useful ways to understand and, in understanding, to facilitate shifts in
the way that environmental “law” making is taking place within the global
arena. This is a conversation that sits at the center of efforts to improve the
vitality of international environmental law; it is equally central to the evolv-
ing climate change debate.
2. Challenging the Normative Foundations
Deliberative thinking about the normative foundations of international
environmental law complements the debate that is taking place around the
framing of the field. While questions of the normative foundations and, in
particular, the underlying principles of international environmental law are
long-standing and have been the subject of great discourse over the past few
decades,103 the nature of the debate has expanded in recent years. This ex-
pansion is largely attributable to patterns of global environmental change,
foremost among which is climate change, and the accompanying onset of a
new era in which humans and the natural world are deeply interconnected,
and in which human and natural systems cannot be viewed as separate and
distinct. In this new era, christened the Anthropocene,104 humans are
103. There is a great deal of scholarly work exploring principles of international envi-
ronmental law, foremost among which is PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3d ed. 2012). Other excellent contributions in this area
include: SUMUDU ATTAPATU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2014);
ELOISE SCOTFORD, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2014).
104. Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Antropocene”, GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSLET-
TER, May 1, 2000, at 17, 17–18, available at http://www.igbp.net/download/18.316f183213
23470177580001401/1316517410973/NL41.pdf. See also Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene:
From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship, 40 AMBIO 739 (2011); Scott, supra note 80, at
315-16 (noting that what is “agreed upon is that the Anthropocene openly challenges the
assumption “of an environment outside or separate from human existence” and forces us to
confront the fact that earth system characteristics “are neither ‘human’ nor ‘natural,’ but are
in fact highly integrated composites of both.”) (quoting Brad Allenby, The Anthropocene As
Media: Information Systems and the Creation of the Human Earth, 52 AM . BEHAV. SCIENTIST 107,
110 (2008)).
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viewed as the primary drivers of environmental change.105 As we drive
global environmental change we find ourselves stumbling towards a series
of planetary boundaries.106 These are boundaries that we have only recently
identified, and the contours of which we are still trying to understand.
The concept of planetary boundaries derives from work published by a
group of scientists in Nature in 2009.107 According to this framework, plane-
tary boundaries “define the safe operating space for humanity with respect
to the Earth system and are associated with the planet’s biophysical subsys-
tems or processes.”108 In key part, the authors “identify the Earth-system
processes and associated thresholds which, if crossed, could generate unac-
ceptable environmental change.”109 These parameters include nine planetary
processes for which we must define planetary boundaries: “climate change;
rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitro-
gen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidifica-
tion; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and
atmospheric aerosol loading.”110 Each of these processes is critical to the
self-regulating capacity of the Earth system and to staying within its bio-
physical thresholds.111 Put simply, “collectively, these planetary boundaries
define the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth sys-
tem,” and “crossing any one of the planetary boundaries may trigger non-
linear changes in the functioning of the Earth system, thereby challenging
social-ecological resilience at regional to global scales.”112
Recognition of the existence of planetary boundaries—and the ways in
which we are rapidly approaching many of these boundaries—has prompted
renewed interest in the normative foundations of international environmen-
tal law and, particularly, in its lack of a grundnorm—or a fundamental norm
providing the underlying basis for the legal system.113 Starting from the
premise that environmental law is a control system that can be used to help
105. Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen & John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are Humans
Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?, 36 AMBIO 614 (2007).
106. J. Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472 (2009). See
also Rakhyun E. Kim & Klaus Bosselmann, International Environmental Law in the Anthro-
pocene: Towards a Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 2 TRANSNAT’L
ENVTL. L. 285 (2013).
107. Rockström et al., supra note 19.




112. Kim & Bosselmann, supra note 19, at 289.
113. Id. at 290; see also Arun Krishnan, A Concise Interpretation of Hans Kelsen’s Pure
Theory of Law, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK ELEC. J. 6-7 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1521569 (describing Hans Kelsen’s theory of the grundnorm).
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achieve ecological stability, we can view international environmental law as
a fragmented system lacking internal cohesion. As a result, the field is char-
acterized by inconsistencies and ineffectiveness. Consequently, patterns of
environmental degradation persist resulting in the onset of the
Anthropocene.
Within the Anthropocene, the argument goes, as the many layers of
human-human and human-nature interconnectedness are revealed, the
shortcomings of our system of international environmental law become
clearer and more urgent.114 As human influence on the environment be-
comes more pervasive, the need for a coherent and effective system of inter-
national environmental law becomes more pressing. Yet, the absence of a
unifying goal condemns international environmental law to a life of inco-
herency and ineffectiveness.
In order to breathe life into a faltering system, Kim and Bosselmann
suggest that we must define an ultimate purpose for international environ-
mental law—a grundnorm—and that that ultimate purpose must be to protect
“the biophysical preconditions that are essential for long-term sustainable
development.”115 That is, they propose a grundnorm for international envi-
ronmental law premised on the notion of planetary boundaries. Protecting
and restoring planetary boundaries offers a strong candidate for a unifying
norm for international environmental law, they argue, because it allows us,
first, to conceptualize the limits of the Earth’s life-support system and, sec-
ond, to center environmental governance systems around the necessity of
staying within those limits. Recognizing the need to protect and restore
global ecological integrity as the grundnorm of international environmental
law would create a normative hierarchy within the field. This, in turn,
would enhance legitimacy, cohesion, and effectiveness across the policy
space.
Kim and Bosselmann’s theory offers a new and creative idea for
strengthening our system of international environmental law even as we
look beyond the traditional system to find workable solutions to complex
problems. Although this is not the only example of innovative thinking
about the normative foundations of international environmental law, Kim
and Bosselmann’s idea highlights innovation within the field and the dy-
namic nature of on-going efforts to critically analyze what tools we have at
our disposal to strengthen core systems.116
114. Kim & Bosselmann, supra note 19, at 286; see also Thijs Etty et al., Norms, Networks,
and Markets: Navigating New Frontiers in Transnational Environmental Law, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL.
L. 203, 205 (2013).
115. Kim & Bosselmann, supra note 19, at 288.
116. It is beyond the parameters of this Article to delve into the topic, but Kim and
Bosselmann’s article also picks up on an ongoing debate within international environmental
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It is beyond the purview of this Article to attempt to more thoroughly
map the evolution that is taking place within the field of international envi-
ronmental law. This brief engagement with the internal dynamics of the
field is important as it highlights the harms that result from allowing the
struggles within the climate change regime to overshadow the larger field of
international environmental law and, in so doing, deflect energy and atten-
tion from efforts within this larger space to remain dynamic. The ability of
the field to remain dynamic becomes ever more important as we confront
an increasingly complex and persistent suite of environmental problems.
In the end, a critical part of improving efforts to address environmental
problems big and small is to think more critically about not only what can
be done internally within the field to improve its effectiveness, but also
where the limits of international environmental law are and what to do
when we reach those limits. When we talk about the failure of international
environmental law to address climate change and other complex environ-
mental problems these failures do not belong solely, or even primarily to
international environmental law. These failures are collective and pervasive
and they require us to reassess what work the label of international environ-
ment law is doing to inhibit more effective efforts to address these big
global environmental issues; these big human issues.
Moving forward, conversations about global environmental problems
should start by recognizing that “[i]nternational environmental law is conse-
quential. It does matter. It should matter much more.”117 But, these conver-
sations should also recognize that systems and actors outside of
international environmental law are also consequential. They do matter.
Their actions and inactions should matter much more in the conversation
about efforts to address problems that are, but are also much more than,
problems of international environmental law.
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE BEYOND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Framing climate change, at the global level, as a problem of and for
international environmental law casts a shadow over the field that masks the
ways in which efforts to address global environmental problems are evolving
and deflects from conversations about how to further improve the function-
ing of the field. Yet, this static framing produces an even greater harm.
law of the wisdom of continuing to hold out ‘sustainable development’ as a driving principle
of international environmental law. Id. at 307. Cf. Anton, supra note 70 (providing a critique
of sustainable development and, in particular, critiquing sustainable development as merely a
cloak for continuing patters of economic growth).
117. Anton, supra note 70, at 212.
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Framing climate change as an international environmental law problem
and assigning it almost exclusively to the forums of international environ-
mental law—here, the UNFCCC and, to a lesser degree, the now wilting
Kyoto Protocol118—allows policymakers to opt-out too easily. The parties to
the UNFCCC are tasked with framing a global approach to addressing cli-
mate change that informs state actors as to their legal obligations119 and, in
so doing, encourages the formulation of state-based efforts to address cli-
mate change that, in turn, ushers in a comprehensive response to the prob-
lem. The nature of this task ignores global political realities across a number
of planes.
Every facet of the framing is flawed or, more accurately, incomplete.
The failings of this framing have been recognized for some time, with more
acute understanding following the Copenhagen Climate Change Confer-
ence in 2009120—the nadir for global climate change law and policy. Never-
theless, the framing persists. And, despite all of the recent talk about
regional and bilateral climate agreements121 and carbon clubs,122 there is a
sense that states continue to wait for the UNFCCC COP to establish a new
118. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
119. Or, legal outcomes, as the case may be. While the 1990 U.N. General Assembly
resolution that launched the U.N. climate change negotiations and, ultimately, culminated in
the adoption of the UNFCCC called for “a framework convention on climate change, and
other related instruments, containing appropriate commitments for action to combat climate
change and its adverse effects,” the more recent Durban Platform calls for a more generalized
process to develop a “protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome,” and it entirely
omits any language about commitments. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res. 45/212, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/212 (Dec. 21, 1990), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm; Establishment of an Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UNFCCC Dec. 1/CP.17, para. 2
(Dec. 11, 2011). In this way, the Durban Platform creates a mandate for some manner of legal
agreement, but the mandate is imprecise; the meaning of “legal outcome” is sufficiently
ambiguous to offer an escape hatch if, in three years’ time, the parties to the UNFCCC
remain divided. As a result, the future of climate change mitigation efforts remains uncertain
at best. Cinnamon Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework, supra note 50, at 18. See also Dan
Bodansky, Evaluating Durban, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 12, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2011/12/12/evaluating-durban/.
120. See Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework, supra note 50, at 8-12 (providing an
overview of the lead-up to and fall-out from the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference).
121. See, e.g., Environmental Law Institute, President Obama’s Climate Agenda, 43 ENVTL.
L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10725, 10726 (2013) (discussing, in part, the President’s commit-
ment to “expand major new and existing international initiatives, including bilateral initia-
tives with China, India, and other major emitting countries”).
122. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer & Bryce Rudyk, Building Blocks
for Global Climate Protection, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341, 364-74 (discussing the theory and
possibilities of carbon/climate clubs).
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guiding framework before diving in too deep with their own sub-global ef-
forts to address climate change.123 Despite a continually deepening under-
standing of the ubiquitous nature of the causes and consequences of climate
change,124 the notion still persists that until the global community agrees on
the way forward, it is risky and politically undesirable to commit to a cer-
tain course of action.
It is indisputable that the UNFCCC is an important institution. The
UNFCCC defines the parameters for global discourse and provides an es-
sential forum for dialogue and decisionmaking. It is, and always has been,
the focal point for the development of principles of international environ-
mental law in the climate change context. Yet, it is not enough. After over
twenty years of global negotiations, our understanding of the massive125
nature of the problem demands that we reassess how we frame climate
change and, in framing climate change, shape political response. It is a
problem of and for international environmental law. However, it is and
must be treated as much more; it is a problem of human health, security,
and well-being and, ultimately, a problem that exposes layers of human and
non-human vulnerabilities. It is more than international, more than envi-
ronmental, more than legal. Each of these dimensions will be considered in
turn.
123. There are, of course, important exceptions, including the European Union’s climate
change strategy and, to a lesser extent, the United States’ recent efforts to carve out a climate
change strategy under the umbrella of the Clean Air Act. See generally Michael B. Gerrard,
United States Climate Change Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW (forthcoming 2015) (copy on file with author); Sanja Bogojevic, European Union Climate
Change Law: Leadership Ambitions in a Multilateral Regime, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (forthcoming 2015) (copy on file with author); Joanne Scott &
Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469 (2012); Rafael
Leal-Arcas, The Role of the EU, the US, and China in Addressing Climate Change, in THE EU
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 221 (2012); CINNAMON CARLARNE, CLI-
MATE CHANGE LAW & POLICY: EU & US APPROACHES (2010).
124. See IPCC 2014, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAP-
TATION, AND VULNERABILITY (March 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/
uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf.
125. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72–80
(2010) (suggesting a framework for looking at complex problems whereby the problem is
approached as a “massive problem” that requires more precise definition and is capable of
being more effectively—if not fully—addressed through carefully crafted regulatory
frameworks).
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A. Climate Change & International Environmental Law:
Global Problem, Global Solution?
Much ink has been spilled analyzing the question of whether interna-
tional law matters. This Article, for its part, accepts as true that “[t]he theo-
retical debate over whether international law matters is a stale one.”126
Instead of re-visiting the similar and equally stale question of whether inter-
national environmental law matters,127 this Article probes a more pressing
question: can and should international environmental law be relied upon to
provide the full foundation upon which global efforts to address climate
change are built? The answer is no.128
In the early days of the climate change debate, the global community
modeled their primary legal vehicle, the UNFCCC, along the lines of a
much-heralded multilateral environmental agreement: the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.129 The Montreal Protocol,
functioning on a system of economy-wide emissions reductions targets and
timetables, had shown early promise as an effective system for prompting
state parties to adopt domestic measures that demonstrated how they would
126. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Schol-
arship, 106 AM . J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012) (the authors continue by emphasizing that “[w]hat
matters now is the study of the conditions under which international law is formed and has
effects. International law is the product of specific forces and factors; it accomplishes its ends
under particular conditions.”).
127. I have already stated my agreement with Anton and others that “international envi-
ronmental law is consequential.” Anton, supra note 70, at 212.
128. For a related discussion advocating a bottom-up approach to addressing climate
change and trade, see generally Rafael Leal Arcas, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches in
Climate Change and International Trade, ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE EURO-LATIN STUDY NETWORK
OF INTEGRATION AND TRADE 23 (2012), available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/
2012/10379a05.pdf (suggesting that: “there is no need to have a global solution/universal
agreement to this global problem so long as the major GHG emitters reduce their GHG
emissions locally. . . .”).
129. See, e.g., William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 486
(2010) (noting that, “[b]uilding on the Montreal Protocol experience, both the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and the Kyoto Protocol
sought to carry forward the agenda of Earth systems governance, embracing the overarching
goal of managing anthropogenic influences on the Earth’s climate system in a comprehensive
fashion.”); Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing
Shadow, 2007 SUP . CT. REV. 111, 153 (2007) (suggesting that: “[f]ollowing the model of the
successful Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 154 nations at the
Rio “Earth Summit” in 1992 signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC endorsed the principle of controlling emissions of
greenhouse gases to prevent harm to the global environment, but it did not establish specific
numeric limits or timetables for reducing emissions.”).
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achieve legally mandated emissions reductions over a set period of time.130
The ‘targets and timetables’ approach ostensibly created a structure that
reflected both the fact that ozone depletion was a problem of the global
commons that required collective action, and that the differences between
developing and developing countries must be accommodated in various
ways.
Given the similarities between the ozone depletion problem and the
climate change problem and, in particular, the fact that they were both
global collective action problems,131 it is not surprising that early discussion
about climate change held the Montreal Protocol up as a model for efforts
within the climate context. As late as 1997, when the parties to the
UNFCCC negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, the global community still held
out hope that some version of an internationally-defined emissions reduc-
tions ‘targets and timetables’ approach could mobilize states into adopting
the types of national policies necessary to address the problem.
But the differences between the climate and ozone problems exceed the
similarities. In particular, differences in the ease with which the offending
substances can be eliminated and the economic incentives for doing so vary
to such a degree as to render any type of comparative analysis impractical.
As Stewart et al. note, while “[g]lobal atmospheric ozone depletion provides
an environmental example of a situation in which it was in the self-interest
of major jurisdictions to unilaterally take action that would provide global
benefits,” “[m]ost developed country governments have concluded that the
discernible national benefits from unilateral action to mitigate climate
change are unlikely to outweigh the national costs over a politically relevant
timeframe, notwithstanding the fact that the long-term benefits appear to
be large.”132
130. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N.
Climate Change Regime, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 697, 700 (2011) (commenting that “[g]iven the Mon-
treal Protocol’s perceived success, many not surprisingly viewed it as a model for the climate
change issue and proposed using the same regulatory approach—that is, internationally nego-
tiated, economy-wide targets and timetables.”).
131. See, e.g., Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis” – Struggling for Worldwide Collective
Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 334-45 (2008) (suggesting that “cooperation is
required to effectively address this threat; however the climate crisis represents a classic
collective action problem in response to overexploitation of a global commons.”).
132. See, e.g., Stewart, Oppenheimer, and Rudyk, supra note 122, at 349-51 (noting more
fully that “[g]lobal atmospheric ozone depletion provides an environmental example of a
situation in which it was in the self-interest of major jurisdictions to unilaterally take action
that would provide global benefits,” due to the costs associated with related human health
problems and the relative containability of the costs of achieving the necessary reductions.”
In other words, the cost benefit analysis supported reducing ozone depleting substances. In
contrast, the authors note that “[t]his scenario. . . is not viable in the climate case.” In other
words, the cost-benefit analysis is more complex and does not clearly lean towards early or
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If it had been the case, as with the Montreal Protocol, that a system of
international environmental law could be crafted in such a way as to effec-
tively incentivize and facilitate widespread state support and correspond-
ingly high levels of state action, then we could continue to treat climate
change as primarily a problem of and for international environmental law.
But this is not the case. Climate change differs from ozone depletion and
from other issues around which we have structured functional international
environmental law regimes.133 It is unlikely that the parties to the
UNFCCC representing, as they do, every UN Member State—will be able
to craft legal infrastructure that serves as the foundation upon which we
build a global solution to climate change that consists of carefully hewn
state-based emissions reduction systems.
This vision precedes and is outdated by what we have learned during
twenty plus years of international climate negotiations. Thus, in 2011, when
the parties to the UNFCCC tasked the Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action-with the task of “develop[ing] a protocol,
another legal instrument or a legal outcome under the Convention applica-
ble to all Parties”134 no later than 2015 in order for that agreement to come
into effect and begin to be implemented in 2020,135 the task seemed daunt-
ing and unlikely to produce the type of legally binding agreement that the
global community might have envisioned in 1992, 1997, or even up until
2009. And, despite its emphasis on deadlines and legal instruments, the
ambiguous language of the Durban Platform reflects the changing nature of
the legal process and changing expectations, calling as it does for a genera-
lized process to develop a “protocol, another legal instrument or a legal
outcome,”136 and omitting any language about legally binding commit-
ments. The meaning of “legal outcome” is sufficiently ambiguous to offer an
escape hatch if, in 2015, the parties to the UNFCCC remain unable to
achieve consensus on this best way forward.137
aggressive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions economy-wide. As they suggest,
“[m]ost developed country governments have concluded that the discernible national benefits
from unilateral action to mitigate climate change are unlikely to outweigh the national costs
over a politically relevant timeframe, notwithstanding the fact that the long-term benefits
appear to be large.”).
133. Climate change is similar to global biodiversity protection in this regard.
134. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Estab-
lishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, ¶ 2, CP.17/
2011/L.10 (Dec. 11, 2011).
135. Id. at ¶ 4.
136. Id. at ¶ 2.
137. See Cinnamon Carlarne, The Future of the UNFCCC: Adaptation and Institutional
Rebirth for the International Climate Convention 19-20 (Ctr. for Interdisc. L. & Pol’y Stud. at
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With this constantly evolving mandate and an increasing sense of ur-
gency tinted with desperation, the parties to the UNFCCC still plow for-
ward with negotiations. While these negotiations may not produce, at least
in the short-term, a legal instrument that meets the vision that the global
community had in mind during the early years of the negotiations, what
these negotiations do contribute is an increasingly sophisticated knowledge
base around climate change. This knowledge—knowledge about the nuances
of the problem, about the success and failure of different institutional in-
struments, and about the different needs and interests of the various stake-
holders—is invaluable.138
These contributions are vital, but they often lack legal character and, as
such, they may not be thought of as part of the system of international
climate change law. Yet, as will be discussed infra, the importance of the
programs and experiences that have emerged from over twenty years of
UNFCCC activity exemplify the need for a more expansive understanding
of the role of international legal institutions in this (and other) contexts.
For now, accepting as true that the UNFCCC is a vital legal institu-
tion—but one that we cannot expect to lay a comprehensive foundation
upon which to build in the near term—the question that follows is: what
comes next? As a starting point, the international forum must be contextu-
alized more centrally within the world in which it exists; a world where
state economies are driven by energy, where energy needs are seen as intri-
cately linked with economic growth and well-being, and where efforts to
address climate change through mitigation measures are inextricably linked
to energy policy choices. Domestic energy policy shapes perceptions of cli-
mate change and willingness to support specific climate policies. One of the
primary reasons that key state actors do not find it to be in their self-
interest to unilaterally take action to mitigate climate change is because of
the difficulty and potential economic disruption that would characterize any
effort to modify the existing energy infrastructure, in developed countries.
In developing countries—especially within the rapidly developing econo-
mies—similar concerns prevail but here the focus is on the negative implica-
the Mortiz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 172, 2012) (providing a more detailed discus-
sion of the context surrounding the negotiations for the Durban Platform).
138. This includes, but is not limited to, instruments ranging from market based mitiga-
tion mechanisms, to methods for facilitating technology transfer, to evolving programs for
reducing emissions from the forestry sector, to tools for assessing and planning for climate
vulnerability, to the recent creation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts. See generally U. N. Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, Nov. 11-23, 2011, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Dam-
age Associated with Climate Change Impacts, 6-8 CP.19/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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tions for economic growth associated with slowing the development of
energy infrastructure (largely fossil fuel infrastructure).
Domestic (and global) energy policy, thus, sits at the center of the cli-
mate change debate. Part of moving towards a collective agreement is dis-
covering what types of policies will be necessary to transform the energy
infrastructure of different types of economies and, in key part, how to de-
carbonize these economies. At this point, there is no evidence to suggest
that even the most advanced economies have a workable blueprint for how
to achieve this result at ad economy-wide scale within an appropriate
timeframe.139 Until states understand the pathways to decarbonizing their
economies, it does not make sense to spend time arguing about how to set
one ultimate global goal or, equally, how to divide up that goal.
What is clear is that, almost across the board, the short-term costs of
efforts to decarbonize are seen as dwarfing the perceived long-term benefits,
as significant as they might be. Yet, without far-reaching changes to domes-
tic energy policies worldwide, global efforts to mitigate climate change will
fail.140 As one of the co-chairs for Working Group II of the IPCC Fifth
Assessment Report recently posited, we will instead have to refocus our
energies on managing141 and, ultimately, surviving climate change.142
This is not an ideal approach. Efforts to manage climate change are
already integral to climate planning—and necessarily becoming more so—
but the mitigation side cannot be neglected. As the IPCC warns in its Fifth
Assessment Report:
[D]elaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today through
2030 is estimated to substantially increase the difficulty of the tran-
sition to low longer-term emissions levels and narrow the range of
options consistent with maintaining temperature change below 2°C
relative to pre-industrial levels (high confidence).143
139. See infra Section IV(B)(iii) (discussing the continuing divide between environmen-
tal law and energy law).
140. The possibility for this scenario is why there is increasing research and debate
around the perils and possibilities of geoengineering or, more specifically, solar radiation
management and carbon sequestration techniques. See, e.g., Burns & Strauss, supra note 88;
Scott, supra note 80; Carlarne, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering Wishes, supra note 88.
141. Climate Change: We Can Adapt, Says IPCC, FORBES (March 31, 2014), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulrodgers/2014/03/31/climate-change-is-real-but-its-not-the-
end-of-the-world-says-ipcc/.
142. See, e.g., Uri Fiedman & Svati Kristen Narula, The UN’s New Focus: Surviving, Not
Stopping, Climate Change, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1, 2014, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2014/04/the-uns-new-focus-surviving-not-stopping-climate-change/
359929/.
143. IPCC 2014, supra note 124, at 13.
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To accept massive climate change as inevitable or to allow the costs of
responding to climate change to accumulate exponentially because our early
efforts to develop a centralized approach based on pre-existing legal struc-
tures have been ineffective is to let ourselves off too easily. To accept this
approach would be to the detriment of all. Freeing the mitigation debate
from a framing that requires it to begin with international environmental
law in a formulaic way, makes it possible to move past a vision that has at its
center a centralized, consensus-based solution as an essential predecessor to
action. It also allows the parties to the UNFCCC to think more creatively
ways moving forward.144
As an alternative vision, for example, imagine the gradual construction
of a system more akin to a Roman aqueduct, with multiple arches joining
together to span a great distance. It is difficult and time consuming to con-
struct; it relies on the integrity of each arch to hold up the larger system;
ultimately, it must piece together as a whole system. In the climate context,
each arch represents a domestic or regional climate change program, tai-
lored according to domestic energy, environmental, economic, and social
politics. In the beginning, the arches are constructed at different paces us-
ing different materials. During the building process many mistakes will be
made and building plans will change—sometimes halting indefinitely or re-
quiring some dismantling.145 But through these focused processes, the
builders can pay attention to detail; they can experiment with different
combinations of regulatory strategies, incentive structures, and political en-
gagement to improve understanding of the demand and supply-side barriers
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Through this experimentation, which
will doubtlessly be more aggressive in some contexts than in others, policy-
makers can begin to cultivate more sophisticated strategies for bringing
about larger shifts in domestic energy portfolios.
Just as deciding to refocus energies on managing climate change at the
expense of mitigation is not ideal, this vision is similarly imperfect. It in-
volves overcoming very real political impediments to unilateral action. As
Richard Lazarus has described:
The science of climate change creates a series of forbidding law-
making obstacles that contribute to climate change’s wickedness as
a public policy problem. But one reason that those obstacles are so
potentially overwhelming is because they work in tandem with
144. See generally Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework, supra note 50.
145. E.g., the repeal of the Australian carbon tax on July 1, 2014. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERN-
MENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, REPEAL OF THE CARBON TAX, http://www.environment
.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
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human nature. Whether as a result of hard- or soft-wiring, human
beings as a species tend to think in certain ways. As described by
the field of cognitive psychology, we tend to favor some outcomes
over others, are able to grasp some kinds of concepts more readily
than others, and use a series of mental shortcuts or “heuristics” in
making decisions. As applied to climate change, these cognitive
tendencies and limitations produce a “massive social trap.”146
In other words, the inability to discreetly visualize climate change, and
the disconnect between cause and effect and temporal challenges creates
layers of political complexity around the problem. This complexity makes it
difficult for policymakers to convince constituencies of the need for imme-
diate actions, especially when those actions entail short-term costs for long-
term benefits. Compounding this is the collective action nature of the prob-
lem. As the IPCC describes it:
Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action prob-
lem at the global scale, because most greenhouse gases (GHG) ac-
cumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent
(e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect other
agents.147
There has been considerable scholarly discussion about the collective
action nature of climate change and concomitant discussions about the trag-
edy of the commons,148 prisoner’s dilemmas,149 and free rider problems,150
146. Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1173-74 (2009) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinsk, The
Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300 (2000)). See also Robert
Costanza, Social Traps and Environmental Policy, 37 BIOSCIENCE 407, 408 (1987).
147. IPCC 2014, supra note 124.
148. See, e.g., Kristen H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190-209 (2005).
149. See, e.g., Schenck, supra note 131, at 345-59. Cf. generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (offering alternative theory to the classic prisoner dilemma
framing within the context of international relations).
150. See, e.g., Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved?, 24
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 211, 219 (2008) (observing that “the allocation of responsibility for
the existing stock of carbon in the atmosphere (which developing countries point out was put
there by the industrialized countries) is complex; carbon emissions per head are low in those
countries most rapidly increasing their emissions; some countries (and, particularly, some
countries’ political elites) may actually benefit from climate change, and generally the effects
vary greatly between countries; there are powerful - multidimensional - free-rider incentives;
the measurement of emissions (including, to list just a few, rain-forest depletion, soil ero-
sion, methane from permafrost melting, aviation and shipping, agriculture, and ocean and
other sink depletion) is at best weak; and there are, at present, no serious enforcement
mechanisms.”). See also Robert N. Stavins, Beyond Kyoto: An Economic Perspective on Cli-
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and how these social traps impede sub-global efforts to develop climate mit-
igation strategies.
The existence of collective social dilemmas151 motivates the demands
for a centralized solution to climate change. However, even in the absence
of a centralized solution, motivations are changing. As understanding of the
impacts of climate change becomes more widespread and as civil society
concerns over the short-term and long-term impacts of climate change
deepen, national and sub-national efforts to address climate change become
more feasible. This is true in developed countries, where questions of na-
tional security, increasing storm intensity, the availability of insurance, and
human health are contributing to shifting perceptions, and in developing
countries, where high levels of vulnerability to climate change are prompt-
ing increasing calls for action. The vast majority of the World Bank’s mid-
dle-income economies—including the rapidly developing economies of
China, India, and Brazil—exhibit a high level of vulnerability to climate
change in the medium term. This means that these countries are vulnerable
to climate change not just one-hundred years from now but also over the
next decades as a result of climate-related threats to food and water secur-
ity, among others.
As the early impacts of climate change become increasingly visible, do-
mestic policies are showing signs of shifting.152 In the United States, for
example, which has been a key hold-out country, sub-national efforts to
address climate change have proliferated153 and, together with an active civil
mate Change Policy, Speech at the Institute of International and European Affairs (Sept. 16,
2011) (transcript), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/stavins-presentation
on-beyond-kyoto-for-dublin.pdf.
151. See generally THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: LINKING VUL-
NERABILITY, ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION (Willem Jozef, Meine Martens & Chiung Ting Chang
eds., 2010).
152. See, e.g., White House Facts on U.S.-China Energy Agreement (Nov. 11, 2014),
available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/11/20141112310785.html
#axzz3JLWUBWJZ (discussing recent developments in efforts on the part of the United
States’ and Chinese governments to work cooperatively and at home to address climate
change).
153. See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Governments and the Potential for
BiDirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010); Rachel Brewster, Step-
ping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2010); Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker:
Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1351 (2008); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Change Policies, 155 U. PAL. L. REV. 1961, 1961-62 (2007); Kirsten Engel, State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global
Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. L. 1015,
1022 (2006).
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society-led litigation campaign,154 have prompted the development of an
increasingly complex—but still evolving—regulatory regime. As the United
States’ experience suggests, even in countries that staunchly opposed a le-
gally binding international agreement, when the debate is contained to a
manageable forum and contextualized within a framework that highlights
constituent interests and needs, progress is possible.155
In common with the experiences of other nations worldwide,156 the
ongoing experience of the United States demonstrates the amount of effort
and the degree of experimentation necessary to get workable regimes off
the ground. These hesitantly and haphazardly emerging regimes are not
ideal ways to deal with a pervasive global problem. In the absence of an
optimal solution, however, this type of regulatory development permits the
type of experimentation that enables slow and steady progress, while at the
same time offering hope for increasingly ambitious strategies and revolu-
tionary technological breakthroughs. In the end, with climate change miti-
gation, there is no ideal approach. But, freeing the debate from the notion
that a new conventional international framework is a prerequisite for more
deliberate national or regional action is a necessary step towards allowing, if
not compelling less hesitant mitigation efforts at the sub-global level.
This shift does not mean that UNFCCC and other international insti-
tutions should or will play lesser roles. Quite the contrary; international
institutions have an indispensable role to play in facilitating the construc-
tion of sub-global policies. Ultimately, of course, the UNFCCC provides
the guiding principles and institutional assistance necessary to connect the
arches of sub-global climate policy together to create a system that is
joined-up, even if only roughly so.
The politics of climate change—like climate change itself—might
change gradually or even abruptly to bring about a dramatic reordering of
national priorities.157 Until that time, framing climate change as a problem
154. For an overview, see David L. Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of
Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15
(2012).
155. As Engel and Saleski noted back in 2005, “unilateral subglobal regulation is a via-
ble, if not optimal, approach to global commons environmental problems.” Engel & Saleska,
supra note 148, at 232. See also Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate
Change 39 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095 2009) (pointing out that
with a complex challenge such as climate change, there is no “optimal” solution).
156. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Challenge of Climate Change Adaptation: Learning from
National Planning Efforts in Britain, China and the USA, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 359 (2011); CINNAMON
CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: EU AND US APPROACHES (2010).
157. This could happen because of the increasing visibility and severity of the impacts of
climate change or, for example, because of changing perceptions of the costs and benefits of
responding to climate change as a result of, for example, new technologies or shifting politi-
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primarily of and for international environmental law creates a perpetually
available reason to delay sub-global efforts. At this point in time, the global
community is not capable of using tools of international environmental law
to lay a solid foundation. It may one day be. But, until then, it is essential to
move past a framing that posits that a regime of international environmental
law is a necessary prerequisite to concerted sub-global action.
B. Climate Change & International Environmental Law:
Environmental Problem, Environmental Solution?158
Liberating the debate, at least for the moment, from a vision that re-
quires international consensus as a necessary precondition for moving for-
ward with sub-global efforts to craft mitigation strategies, frees us to
explore the utility of the environmental piece of the international environ-
mental law framing.
Climate change is inherently interdisciplinary. It is an issue that cannot
be understood, much less addressed, without drawing upon experts from
across a wide range of disciplines, including natural and social scientists,
lawyers, engineers, and ethicists. In addition to straddling a wide range of
disciplines, climate change also straddles seemingly distinct fields of law.
More than any other nominally “environmental” issue, climate change de-
mands a rethinking of the adequacy of working within the conventional
paradigm for addressing environmental problems.159
1. Challenging the Conventional Climate Paradigm
There is widespread recognition that climate change impacts human
health and well-being and that efforts to address climate change implicate
questions of economics, equity, security, and human health and well-being.
As previously discussed, the IPCC’s 5AR highlights these impacts and rela-
tionships in no uncertain terms. Beyond the IPCC, there is ample debate
(and scholarship) exploring the ways in which climate change intersects
with long-standing legal and political dilemmas, as well as giving rise to
new legal and political questions. Efforts abound to identify the ways in
which climate change aggravates and is aggravated by decisions made
cal alliances. See, e.g., White House Facts on U.S.-China Energy Agreement, supra note 152
(discussing U.S. – Chinese collaboration); U.S.-China Climate Surprise – a Coal Plant that
Stores CO2 and Makes Fresh Water, ENERGYWIRE, Nov. 17, 2014 (discussing a proposed new
technology that, if successful, could change perceptions of the costs and benefits of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions).
158. John Copeland Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism, 40 ENVTL. L. 53 (2010).
159. Ivana Zofko, International Law-Making for the Environment: A Question of Effective-
ness, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING AND DIPLOMACY REVIEW (Marko Berglund
ed., 2006).
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outside of the parameters (often far beyond the outer reach) of the climate
change regime or international environmental law, more broadly. From ef-
forts to reframe climate change as a security issue160 or as an issue of funda-
mental human rights,161 to efforts to utilize the links between climate
change and cultural heritage law,162 the law of sea,163 and intellectual prop-
erty law,164 there is little question that these linkages exist, that they matter,
and that there is political recognition of these connections.
Nevertheless, early efforts to broaden the debate about climate change
by inserting climate change into prominent international forums such as the
UN Security Council, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights165, and the Law of the Sea largely came to naught. In 2007, for
160. See, e.g., Carlarne, Risky Business, supra note 44. See also Press Release, Secretariat,
UN Sec’y-Gen. Announces ‘Nairobi Framework’ to Help Developing Countries Participate
in the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Press Release, Nov. 15, 2001, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/061115_cop12_pressrel_
1.pdf (wherein then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan described climate change as a threat
to global security, saying that “[g]lobal climate change must take its place alongside the
threats of conflict, poverty and the proliferation of deadly weapons that have traditionally
monopolized first-order political attention.”).
161. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010); Randall S.
Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Commonality Among Unique Indigenous Communities: An Intro-
duction to Climate Change and its Impacts on Indigenous Peoples, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 193-94
(2013); Marilyn Averill, Linking Climate Litigation and Human Rights, 18 REV. OF EUR. COM -
MUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 139 (2009); Depledge & Carlarne, supra note 45, at 237–38 (2007)
(providing an overview of attempts by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to bring before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights allegations of human rights violations against
the United States for both its contribution to climate change and its failure to alleviate
climate change); Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A
Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (2007).
162. See, e.g., William C.G. Burns, Belt and Suspenders?: The World Heritage Convention’s
Role in Confronting Climate Change, 17 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 359 (2009); Cinnamon
Carlarne, Climate Change, Cultural Heritage & the Oceans: Rethinking Regulatory Approaches to
Climate Change, 17 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 271, 290-93 (2009).
163. See e.g., William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages
in International Fora: The Law of the Sea, 2 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 27 (2006);
William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under the United
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 7 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 34 (2007); William C.G.
Burns, The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages at the
International Level, 98 AM . SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 223, 227 (2004); Meinhard Doelle, Climate
Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, 37 J.
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 319 (2006); Lucy Wiggins, Existing Legal Mechanisms to Address
Oceanic Impacts from Climate Change, 7 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 22 (2007).
164. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 301 (2011); IN THE WILDS OF CLIMATE LAW 84, 87 (Rosemary Lyster ed., 2010).
165. Hari Osofsky, Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM . INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007) (exploring the challenges posed
to the Inuit by rapid climate change and the legal implications of the Inuit Petition to the
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example, in one of the most prominent efforts to elevate the discussion
around climate change, then President of the Security Council, UK Foreign
Secretary Margaret Beckett, initiated166 the Security Council’s first ever de-
bate on the impact of climate change on peace and security.167 This debate
took place in the wake of the Kyoto Protocol entering into force (February
2005) and prior to the disastrous Copenhagen Climate Conference (2009)
in what was a pivotal time for global climate politics; a time when there was
still some hope of lifting the debate about climate change out of the quag-
mire of collective-action politics that was increasingly hampering
UNFCCC negotiations. The Security Council debate, however, revealed
the extent to which member states disagreed over the appropriateness of
framing climate change as an issue of peace and security.
China and Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, resisted
efforts to classify climate change as a peace and security matter that fit
within the ambit of the Security Council. Instead, they insisted that the
climate change debate belonged in the Economic and Social Council and in
the General Assembly. In contrast, Papua New Guinea declared that the
impact of climate change on small islands was “no less threatening than the
dangers guns and bombs posed to large nations.”168 Echoing Papua New
Guinea’s comments, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, commented that
“[w]ar had too often been the means to secure possession of scarce re-
sources” and suggested to the member states that the Security Council has a
role to play in addressing an issue that has “implications for peace and se-
curity.”169 In the end, the Security Council debate did not produce any
discernible outcomes except, perhaps, to solidify the climate change-secur-
ity linkage as a point of varying concern among the member states.
Inter-American Human Rights Commission alleging that acts and omissions on the part of
the United States violated Inuit human rights); Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Testimony before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (March 1, 2007) (transcript) [hereinafter,
Watt-Cloutier Testimony], available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR_WC_Mar
07.pdf; CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., INUIT FILE PETITION WITH INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, CLAIMING GLOBAL WARMING CAUSED BY UNITED STATES IS DESTROYING THEIR
CULTURE AND LIVELIHOODS (2005) [hereinafter, INUIT PETITION], available at http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf.
166. The debate was prompted by a request from Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations. Letter dated
Apr. 5, 2007, supra note 54.
167. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds First Ever Debate on the
Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing over 50 Speakers, U.N. Press Release
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Despite the absence of consensus in the Security Council, as under-
standing of climate change grows, climate change figures more and more
prominently on global and national security agendas. In 2012, for example,
the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability de-
clared that climate change poses “new challenges to international peace and
security.”170 More recently, U.S. Navy Admiral, Samuel J. Locklear III, as-
serted that political upheaval related to climate change “is probably the most
likely thing that is going to happen . . . that will cripple the security envi-
ronment, probably more likely than the other scenarios we all often talk
about. . . . You have the real potential here in the not-too-distant future of
nations displaced by rising sea level.”171
As time passes, climate-security linkages are receiving increasing atten-
tion. Behind the scenes, military forces are at the forefront of thinking
through the types of security risks that climate change poses and the types
of military responses that are necessary to prepare to combat those risks.172
Yet, the alignment of climate change with security risks has done little to
mainstream the climate conversation. The same can be said for efforts to
frame climate change as a human rights issue (most prominently before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights173).
The conventional paradigm, thus, remains largely intact.
170. U. N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability, Resilient People,
Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing, at 20, U.N. Sales No. E.12.I.2 (2012).
171. Bryan Bender, Chief of US Pacific Forces Calls Climate Biggest Worry, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 9, 2013, http://bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/09/admiral-samuel-locklear-
commander-pacific-forces-warns-that-climate-change-top-threat/BHdPVCLrWEM-
xRe9IXJZcHL/story.html. Similarly, in a recently released report, a group of retired military
leaders cautioned that “[i]n many areas, the projected impacts of climate change will be more
than threat multipliers; they will serve as catalysts for instability and conflict.” CNA MILITARY
ADVISORY BOARD, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ACCELERATING RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2014),
available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/MAB_2014.pdf.
172. See, e.g., NIC Publications, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, http://
www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-nic-publications
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (including a list of NIC commissioned reports on the effects of
climate change on different parts of the world, including India, China, Russia, North Africa,
Mexico and the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island States). See also John
M. Broder, Climate Change Report Outlines Perils for U.S. Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/science/earth/climate-change-report-outlines-perils-for-
us-military.html?_r=0; Joshua Zaffos, U.S. Military Forges Ahead with Plans to Combat Climate
Change, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Apr. 2, 2012, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/us-military-forges-ahead-with-plans-to-combat-climate-change/.
173. See Osofsky, supra note 165; Watt-Cloutier Testimony, supra note 165; Inuit Petition,
supra note 165.
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2. Working Within the Conventional Paradigm
Having failed to crack the conventional paradigm, legal debates about
climate change continue to frame and approach the problem in traditional
environmental terms. In the international context, this means that global
efforts to mitigate climate change focus on agreeing upon a basic emissions
reductions model, akin to the Montreal Protocol (as discussed infra). This
model is also not dissimilar to the basic way in which the U.S. Clean Air
Act (CAA) functions. The CAA tasks the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency with establishing national ambient air quality standards but then
largely leaves it up to the states to decide how they are going to achieve
those air quality standards.174 Similarly, at the international level, the par-
ties to the UNFCCC focus on trying to achieve an overarching global goal
that will serve as the basis for devising more precise commitments on the
part of each state, but with the state retaining final and near complete au-
thority over how it chooses to achieve those goals.
Similarly, at the sub-global level, states largely continue to employ con-
ventional pollution paradigms as the basis for emergent climate change mit-
igation efforts. This is true in the United States, for example, where the
CAA is the primary federal vehicle for addressing climate change. This
framing persists despite mounting challenges to the adequacy of this ap-
proach, including claims that the paradigm is “profoundly inadequate for
understanding and dealing with global warming.”175
In his 2010 piece, Climate Exceptionalism, John Copeland Nagle offers a
thoughtful analysis of the pollution paradigm and of the critiques to which
it has been subject. Nagle reminds us that while “[c]limate change presents a
particular challenge because of the global nature of the problem . . . it is also
a typical pollution problem that raises familiar questions of tolerable harms,
proof of causation, and the appropriate balance between legal mandates and
voluntary actions.”176 In highlighting the ways in which climate change is
similar to a typical pollution problem, Nagle effectively advocates that we
embrace an inclusive rather than exclusive approach to addressing climate
change. That is, he cautions against the idea that we must choose between
174. There are, of course, key differences. Under the CAA, all states are subject to the
same ambient air quality standards whereas at the international level, the standards (i.e.,
emissions reductions) that each state is subject to vary. 85 U.S.C. § 7409 (2014). Further,
under the CAA, if a state fails to submit an implementation plan or the implementation plan
is inadequate, the EPA is required to step in and take over implementation until the state is
approved to do so. Id. § 7410.
175. Nagle, supra note 158, at 75 (quoting TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER,
BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 111
(2007)).
176. Id. at 88.
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using conventional regulatory strategies and alternative approaches on the
grounds that it is unlikely that an either or approach premised on traditional
regulation or, for example, innovative energy policy will “constitute the elu-
sive silver bullet” to address climate change.177 After all, even with more
conventional pollution problems, “the law employs a combination of preven-
tion, control, toleration, and avoidance to address pollution problems as dif-
ferent as water pollution and noise pollution and violent entertainment.”178
Why would we expect less in the climate context?
The pollution paradigm, in common with the conventional interna-
tional environmental law paradigm, however, offers a partial solution at
best. It provides scaffolding around which to construct an evolving approach
to addressing climate change. But it is too narrow both in how it depicts
climate change and in the range of behaviors it can influence.
As discussed,179 framing climate change as an environmental problem
and approaching it within the conventional paradigm is what allowed the
global community to coalesce around the issue. Without this initial framing
and the resulting global consensus, it is unlikely that our understanding of
the physical science of climate change would be as sophisticated as it is, or
that the political conversation on climate change—as deficient as it is—
would be as far along as it is.
Viewing climate change as a traditional environmental problem that
must be solved using a set of traditional tools undoubtedly constrains our
response to the problem, but it does not follow that we should abandon
wholesale or even mostly the environmental paradigm. We cannot afford to
abandon our understanding of climate change as an environmental prob-
lem—even as a “typical pollution problem.”180 And, we cannot abandon our
use of environmental law tools to whittle away181 at the climate change
problem. To do so would bode disaster. The United States is not alone in
building a climate change strategy on the foundations of environmental law
and, more specifically, pollution law. If these tools were to be abandoned,
the core of these efforts to address climate change would crumble.
Climate change is an environmental problem. This is not at issue. But,
it is also a security problem, a human rights problem, a trade problem, an
economic problem, a development problem, a public health problem, and,
fundamentally, an energy problem. This complexity alone does not render
climate change unusual. The legal field is scattered with complex questions
177. Id. at 86.
178. Id.
179. See discussion supra Section III(A).
180. Nagle, supra note 158, at 88.
181. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). See also Ruhl & Salzman,
supra note 125, at 71-79.
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that transcend easy classification. Yet, whether law is viewed as concentric
circles or disconnected boxes, the disjunctions between areas of law in the
climate context pose notable challenges for even the most Herculean of
judges,182 as well as for the many lawyers, academics, and members of civil
society who work on the issue. The persistence of these fault lines and the
predominance of the conventional framework impede efforts to address a
nominally environmental issue that impacts humanity in profound ways.
3. Widening the Frame: Climate Change
as an Energy Issue
At a very basic level, climate change needs to be mainstreamed. It needs
to be released from a compartmentalized framing. Perhaps the most effec-
tive way to begin mainstreaming the debate and diversifying efforts to ad-
dress climate change is by widening the frame. The best way to do this is to
more actively frame climate change as an energy challenge.
Climate change sits at the nexus between energy and environmental
law. In the United States, for example, in 2011, carbon dioxide accounted
for eighty-four percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, with ninety-
seven percent of those carbon dioxide emissions attributable to energy
use.183 In the United States, therefore, “the most direct way to reduce future
climate change is to reduce emissions from the energy sector by using en-
ergy more efficiently and switching to lower carbon energy sources.”184 Al-
though the percentages vary, the relationship between carbon dioxide
emissions and energy use sits at the center of efforts to mitigate climate
change across developed and developing countries.
Fundamentally, efforts to mitigate climate change require reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Such reductions require modifying primary en-
ergy infrastructures—including both stationary and mobile sources. In cause
and consequence, as much as climate change is a pollution problem, it is also
an energy problem. Traditionally, questions of energy and environmental
law have been addressed in separate forums using distinct systems of law
and policy.185 In most domestic contexts, there are discrete bodies of energy
182. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 250-53 (1986).
183. U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 32, at 652.
184. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Third National Climate Assessment High-
lights: Responses, GLOBAL CHANGE (2014), http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-
findings/responses.
185. See generally Alexander Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental
and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013).
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law and environmental law.186 Until recently, the fields of energy and envi-
ronmental law have been treated as concentric circles where the areas of
overlap were minimal or, at least, bounded.
Traditionally, the intersections between environmental law and energy
law and policy have been approached at the margins. At the domestic level,
in the United States, for example, this occurs through environmental regu-
lation of the air and water emissions from coal-fired power plants.187 More
generally, in the United States, environmental regulations affect extraction,
transportation, generation, and disposal actions to significantly different de-
grees depending on the energy source (e.g., more for coal, less for gas, and
even less for oil). Across the different sectors, the energy industry continues
to receive significant environmental exemptions and fragmentation both
within the energy field and between the energy and environmental fields
means that energy decisions continue to be made largely in isolation from
larger questions about environmental issues, including climate change.
Similarly, at the international level, international agreements such as
the Montreal Protocol influence production methods and incentivize energy
efficiency.188 On occasion, the decisions of key institutions, such as the
WTO, address tensions between trade, energy, and environmental con-
cerns.189 Here, as in the domestic context, however, the decisions are piece-
meal and there is no substantive and meaningful engagement between key
international energy, environmental, and economic institutions about ways
in which to coordinate energy decisions with overarching global climate
goals.
186. Id.; see also Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: Integration of Energy Law and Envi-
ronmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011); Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and
the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010).
187. For a comprehensive discussion of the environmental regulatory regime for coal, see
Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social Injustice
in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 305 (2013).
188. Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt
Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y OF AM . U. 3, 5 (2007) ( “Past transitions from
CFCs to HCFCs and hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) helped drive technological innovation in
substitutes, manufacturing processes, and equipment, which in many cases resulted in gains
in energy efficiency, reduced leakage, or other technological improvements. To date, about
80 percent of ODSs that would be in use without the Montreal Protocol have been replaced
by non-fluorocarbon chemicals, which do not deplete the ozone layer. These substitutes in-
clude not-in-kind chemical substitutes and product alternatives (e.g., a roll-on deodorant
instead of a spray can), changes to manufacturing processes, conservation measures, and
doing without.”).
189. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Energy Subsidies and the World Trade Organization, 17 ASIL
INSIGHTS 22 (2013), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/22/energy-subsi
dies-and-world-trade-organization.
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The fields remain fragmented and this fragmentation renders efforts to
mitigate climate change hollow. The disconnect between climate change and
energy is really a disconnect between merely identifying the problem of
climate change and actually beginning to experiment with pathways towards
mitigating climate change. As the U.S. Third Assessment Report concludes,
making inroads into addressing climate change “require[s] substantial decar-
bonization of the global economy by the end of this century, implying a
fundamental transformation of the global energy system.”190
In the wake of the release of the IPCC’s AR5 and the Third Assessment
Report, it is impossible to imagine delinking the climate change debate
from energy law and policy. In launching the AR5, the IPCC’s chair, Rajen-
dra Pachauri, advised that: “The high speed mitigation train needs to leave
the station very soon, and all of global society will have to get on board.”191
Critically, all of the mitigation pathways considered in the AR5 involve up-
scaling of low-carbon energy. In discussing the release of Working Group
III’s Report, Mitigation of Climate Change, Ottmar Edenhofer, co-chair of the
group, confirmed this relationship, insisting that “[t]here needs to be a mas-
sive shift away from fossil fuels and investment needs to shift to going 100%
clean as fast as possible.”192 In essence, we must begin mitigating climate
change immediately, which means shifting our energy infrastructure quickly
and dramatically.
Within this context, even the most advanced economies are still in the
early stages of thinking through how to achieve the types of energy shifts
that the IPCC and the Third Assessment indicates are necessary to avoid
the possibility of increasingly severe climate change impacts. As the Third
Assessment emphasizes:
The principal types of national actions that could effect such
changes include putting a price on emissions, setting regulations
and standards for activities that cause emissions, changing subsidy
programs, and direct federal expenditures. Market-based ap-
proaches include cap-and-trade programs that establish markets for
trading emissions permits, analogous to the Clean Air Act provi-
sions for sulfur dioxide reductions. None of these price-based measures
has been implemented at the national level in the U.S.193
190. U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 32, at 657.
191. Matt McGrath, World Must End ‘Dirty’ Fuel Use – UN, BBC NEWS, Apr. 13, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-27008352.
192. Id.
193. U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra note 32, at 653 (emphasis added).
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Thus, while it is increasingly clear that significant changes in the en-
ergy sector are necessary to curb climate change, it is less clear that any
major state or regional players know how to achieve those changes in ways
that are technologically, economically, and politically feasible.194
These characteristics render energy policy distinctly ill-suited to be ad-
dressed through a centralized, top-down approach—either at the global level
or, as the case may be, at the national level. Yet, reform is needed and
reform is needed fast. It is beyond the remit of this Article to explore the
many and varied ways to begin this reform process and the parallel process
of shifting the paradigm in order to approach climate change simultaneously
as an environmental and energy law challenge195—a problem that requires us
to delve more deeply into the mechanics of the prevailing economic model.
In the context of this Article, with its focus on the limits of international
environmental law both to describe and “solve” the climate change problem,
it is worth mentioning how more explicitly depicting climate change as an
energy challenge might begin to shake up our increasingly stagnant policy
efforts at the global level. To do so requires us to start by examining the
foundations of the UNFCCC—the primary global climate law institution.
The UNFCCC is a top-heavy international institution that is not only
state-centered, but also requires consensus196 to make critical decisions.
Consensus in this context relies on achieving agreement between 195 par-
ties. As climate negotiations have evolved and rifts have deepened, consen-
sus has become difficult to achieve, particularly on substantive questions.
194. Further, as the IPCC emphasizes, “[b]ehaviour, lifestyle and culture have a consid-
erable influence on energy use and associated emissions . . . .” Consequently, the changes
necessary to bring about energy shifts vary from place to place. See IPCC 2014, supra note
124, at 21.
195. For an example of such work, see JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY:
PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2011). See also Andrew Long, Complexity in Global Energy-Envi-
ronment Governance, MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 58 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2399936 (noting, in key part, that “[l]iterature since the 2009 UNFCCC
negotiations in Copenhagen is beginning to explore alternatives to top-down binding inter-
national environmental agreements for catalyzing successful mitigation, but it has yet to
coalesce around an analytical framework that can foster synergy and the development of a
cohesive body of work identifying and testing viable options that are likely to produce solid
policy recommendations. A perspective on climate change informed by an understanding of
the global energy system as a complex system has the potential to provide such a
framework.”).
196. See UNFCCC, supra note 10, arts. 7(2)(k) & 15 (dictating that the Conference of
the Parties shall “[a]gree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial rules
for itself and for any subsidiary bodies” and that “[t]he Parties shall make every effort to
reach agreement on any proposed amendment to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts
at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last
resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the
meeting.”).
52 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:1
Despite its rigidity, and because there is no clear competitor institution,197
the UNFCCC continues to shape the collective climate change agenda.
The UNFCCC’s primacy is not set in stone, however. One of the side
effects of the fragmentation that characterizes the field of international law
is that there are often multiple international institutions that have overlap-
ping interest and jurisdiction over an issue. This is true even in the climate
context where there is a tendency to view the UNFCCC as not merely
operating in isolation, but operating in isolation because there is no other
institution that possesses the capacity necessary to address the problem.
This depiction, however, masks the alternative routes that climate change
policy could have followed at its inception. As Meyer notes:
Most of the major emitters in the world in 1992 were OECD (Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries
and therefore members of the International Energy Program (IEP)
Agreement, which created the IEA (International Energy Agency).
A plan to reduce global emissions through binding legal obligations
applicable only to developing countries (in other words, an agree-
ment very similar to the Kyoto Protocol) could thus have been
worked out through the OECD as an amendment to the IEP
Agreement. Such an arrangement would have had the benefit of
allowing closer coordination between developed countries’ general
energy consumption policies and their climate change-specific
efforts.198
The existence of other potential avenues for developing a climate re-
gime suggests that there is some existing capacity for institutional competi-
tion. More specifically, there are a handful of institutions, including the
OECD, the IEA, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),199
the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the
197. Again, the main exception being that the Montreal Protocol plays a part in setting
the agenda when greenhouse gases are also ozone-depleting substances. See Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 82, art. 16.1.
198. Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern International Law-
making, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 602-03 (2014).
199. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) “is an intergovernmental
organisation that supports countries in their transition to a sustainable energy future, and
serves as the principal platform for international cooperation, a centre of excellence, and a
repository of policy, technology, resource and financial knowledge on renewable energy.” As
of 2014, IRENA had 131 members, including the United States, the European Union, China
and India, as well as 37 signatories. About IRENA, IRENA, http://www.irena.org/Menu/
index.aspx?PriMenuID=13&mnu=pri (accessed Oct. 14, 2014). As Steven Ferrey notes,
“IRENA functions in a manner similar to the International Energy Agency (IEA) and to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These agencies give financial, practicable and
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WTO that possess some level of interest and influence in the context of
energy decisionmaking. The existence of multiple institutions with some
level of jurisdiction over energy-related matters suggests that there is capac-
ity outside of the UNFCCC to begin reshaping the climate agenda through
external energy decisionmaking processes. This may lead to positive or neg-
ative results. As Meyer notes when discussing the issue of fragmentation in
regards to energy policy:
Fragmenting jurisdiction allows organizations such as the IEA and
OPEC to function without the paralysis that besets institutions like
the UNFCCC. But animating governance within these institutions
through narrow jurisdiction has the effect of raising the costs of
coordinating legal rules across related institutions, such as the IEA
and the UNFCCC. Fragmentation thus animates governance
within institutions while inhibiting governance across
institutions.200
Fragmentation, thus, creates the potential for inertia-bucking competi-
tion, while also creating added challenges with regards to consistency, pro-
cedural costs, and complexity as well as the fundamental questions of equity
that accompany any process that assigns decisionmaking power to a smaller
handful of state actors.
The goal here is not to unpack the potential pros and cons but to high-
light that “some issues, like energy and climate change, are functionally
linked even if they are not institutionally linked,”201 and that these func-
tional linkages provide opportunities for assessing the possible role that in-
stitutions other than the UNFCCC could play in nudging the climate
change paradigm out of the constrained corner in which it has become so
tightly wedged.
C. Climate Change & International Environmental Law:
Legal Problem, Legal Solution?
If it is true, as Cicero posited, that “[t]he welfare of the people is the
ultimate law,”202 then it is also true that protecting the welfare of the people
in the face of climate change demands much more than formal law. On the
basis of this premise, this Section explores the extent to which any system
technical support to member countries, with IRENA focusing particularly in developing
countries regarding their renewable energy potential.” 1 L. OF INDEP. POWER § 3:8 (2014).
200. Meyer, supra note 198, at 566.
201. Id. at 602.
202. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, III DE LEGIBUS § III, ¶ 8 (T.E. Page et al eds., trans.
Clinton Walker Keyes 1952) (52 B.C.).
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of climate change law must necessarily be situated amidst a much more
extensive governance system; a governance system that is responsive to the
processes and institutions of law, but that is also inclusive of the wider set
of public, private, and intergovernmental activities that shape and support
ongoing lawmaking processes. This examination of the utility of the law
piece of the international environmental law framing will be brief and will
focus on key pieces of the governance system based on the assumption that
there is already widespread understanding of the ways in which law is the
foundation upon which a more comprehensive set of climate change policies
must be built.
As discussed supra in Section III(C), there is general recognition that
perceiving the international policy space as one occupied not just by sys-
tems of law, but also by more extensive governance systems better reflects
the realities of the pluralistic international system. This system is shaped by
formal law, informal rules and norms, and increasingly by public and private
non-state actors and the codes that they develop that influence individual
and collective behavior. All of these influences interact to shape the socio-
legal environment in which decisions are made. Law continues to sit at the
center of this system; it is the heart of the system but it invigorates and, is
invigorated by, the networks of actors and institutions that surround it.
This is particularly true in the context of international environmental
law where it is often difficult to distinguish the lines between hard and soft
law both in substance and effect,203 where non-state actors play an increas-
ingly important role in the creation and implementation of international
environmental law, and where the lines between where law ends and the
surrounding system of environmental governance begin are often hard to
detect.
As previously discussed, there is a vibrant conversation among scholars
of international environmental law about the label we use to describe the
evolving system of law and policy that influences decision-making in the
environmental context. That discussion—focusing on increasing calls to con-
ceive of the space in terms of global environmental law, transnational envi-
ronmental law, or global environmental governance204—reveals how this
debate highlights the many ways in which environmental regimes involve
not just the interaction among different systems of law but also the interac-
tion between systems of law and the multitude of actors, institutions, and
agreements that directly and indirectly shape, and are shaped by these sys-
tems of law.
203. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 14, at 99-100.
204. See discussion supra Section III(C)(2).
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This is equally true in the narrower climate change context. As amply
discussed elsewhere, climate change is a problem of global, transnational,
regional, state, and local character that pushes us to transcend jurisdictional
lines and to approach climate change as a larger governance challenge that
encompasses, but also reaches beyond, the boundaries of international
law.205 Here, rather than offering a diluted discussion of all of the acts and
actors that animate the climate change policy space, this Section briefly
emphasizes two sets of key actors who have and will continue to shape
climate change policy within and beyond formal lawmaking processes: civil
society and the private sector.
Since the onset of negotiations, civil society has played a vital role in
shaping climate change debates and strategies at every level of governance.
The involvement of civil society groups in environmental policy dates back
to the late 1960s, when the growing social movement around environmental
protection helped mobilize support for the development of new environ-
mental laws at the domestic and global levels. The role of civil society con-
tinued to influence environmental decision-making over the years, with the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
de Janeiro (Earth Summit) representing an apex in civil society influence
over international environmental law. The Conference brought together po-
litical and civic leaders from all over the world in one of the most coopera-
tive environmental policy-making forums of all time. As a result of the
energy and initiative brought to the Conference in Rio, the global commu-
nity adopted a suite of hard and soft law agreements, including the
UNFCCC.206
Emerging from its Rio roots, the climate change debate continues to be
heavily influenced by civil society actions. From the massive climate change
litigation campaigns in the United States,207 to the global campaign to high-
205. See generally Deepa Badrinaraya, Global Warming: A Second Coming for International
Law?, 85 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2010); Carlarne, Good Climate Governance, supra note 38; Hari
Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralistic Legal Dialogue, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181
(2007).
206. Other agreements negotiated at Rio included: the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD); the Statement of Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forestry; the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; and Agenda 21, which the UN Commis-
sion on Sustainable Development, and prompting the subsequent adoption of the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.
207. For discussions of this litigation campaign and its implications, see Dave Markell &
J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or
Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and
Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 355 (2011); Hari M.
Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the Future of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 101, 102 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html;
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light the linkages between climate change and human rights,208 to ongoing
efforts to develop new frameworks for responding to climate change dis-
placed peoples209 and compensating climate victims,210 to focused cam-
paigns to stop new fossil fuel projects,211 and beyond, civil society
campaigns have helped to mobilize awareness of the many and varied im-
pacts of climate change. At times, these civil society campaigns have played
direct roles in influencing both public opinion212 and the development of
emergent legal and regulatory regimes.213 At every level, civil society plays
an indispensable role both in innovating and prodding legal and political
decision makers into responding to climate change.
Beyond the sphere of civil society actors that animate efforts to create a
more extensive system of climate change governance, the private sector has
an equally indispensable role to play in addressing climate change. In criti-
cal part, as the IPCC notes in the 5AR, “[i]n many countries, the private
William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes
of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL APPROACHES 1 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
208. See supra notes 167 & 170 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small Island Devel-
oping States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633 (2013); JANE
MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
210. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 509 (2009).
211. An example of this is the campaign against the Keystone Pipeline in the United
States. See, e.g., James Murphy, Tar Sands Development: A Test for our Energy Future, 27 SUM
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 54, 54-56 (2012); Bill McKibben, Op-Ed, With the Keystone Pipeline,
Drawing a Line in the Tar Sands, YALE ENV’T 360, Oct. 6, 2011, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
with_the_keystone_pipeline_drawing_a_line_in_the_tar_sands/2448/ (“For environmental-
ists protesting the Keystone XL pipeline, the battle is about more than just transporting tar
sands oil from Alberta. It’s about whether the United States—and the rest of the world—will
finally come to its senses about global warming.”). See also Suzanne Goldenberg, World Bank’s
$3.75bn Coal Plant Loan Defies Environment Criticism, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2010, http://
www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/09/world-bank-criticised-over-power-station (dis-
cussing failed efforts on the part of climate activists to stop the World Bank from funding a
coal-fired power plant in South Africa).
212. As Sanford Gaines highlights, “The climate change activist group 350.org, with a
very small budget, has used the Internet and social networking to generate worldwide citizen
action in favor of climate mitigation, including a moderately successful campaign for col-
leges, cities, and others to divest from fossil fuel corporations. A “crowdfunding” initiative to
raise capital from many small investors for solar energy projects in California quickly sur-
passed its goals.” Gaines, supra note 72, at 10214.
213. For example, the regulatory regime for greenhouse gases under the U.S. Clean Air
Act exists in large part as a result of litigation, with much of this litigation being instituted
not only by states but also by environmental groups. See National Assosciation of Clean Air
Agencies, Background and History of EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG), NACAA 2
(Feb, 17, 2012), http://www.4cleanair.org/Documents/BackgroundandHistoryEPARegula
tionGHGsFeb2012post.pdf.
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sector plays central roles in the processes that lead to emissions as well as to
mitigation. Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector,
along with the public sector, can play an important role in financing
mitigation.”214
In the most basic of terms, the private sector is both a primary contrib-
utor to climate change and a primary source of hope for beginning to curb
climate change through changing behaviors,215 investments in research and
development, and, perhaps most critically, private sector investment in new,
clean energy technologies. The IPCC AR5 emphasizes the importance of
private sector investment, stating that there needs to be huge shifts in in-
vestment in order to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, noting, in
particular, that “[s]ubstantial reductions in emissions would require large
changes in investment patterns.”216 The pace of investment cannot be slow.
Investment in renewables and other low carbon sources “needs to at least
treble by the middle of the century, while money flowing into fossil fuels
has to diminish.”217
Returning to the previous discussion about climate change as an energy
problem, the massive shift away from fossil fuels that we need and the in-
vestments that we need to initiate that shift require extraordinary levels of
private sector involvement. These shifts will be influenced by governmental
policy and the ability of the public sector to create the rights incentives.
Ultimately, however, the ability of the global community to address climate
change is contingent upon the early and continued involvement of the pri-
vate sector.
There is no question that law is a central tool in addressing climate
change.218 Law and the rule of law are fundamental to addressing climate
change.219 Mobilizing the radical changes needed to bring about effective
214. IPCC, supra note 124, SPM 5.1, at 30.
215. For example, the WGIII Report finds that: “The energy intensity of the industry
sector could be directly reduced by about 25 percent compared to the current level through
the wide-scale upgrading, replacement and deployment of best available technologies, partic-
ularly in countries where these are not in use and in non-energy intensive industries.” Id. at
24.
216. IPCC, supra note 124, SPM 5.1, at 27.
217. McGrath, supra note 191. The Report notes, in key part, that: “[t]he reduction of
subsidies for GHG-related activities in various sectors can achieve emission reductions, de-
pending on the social and economic context (high confidence).” IPCC, supra note 124, SPM
5.1, at 29 (emphasis omitted).
218. Law can be used to force change, to incentivize change, and to bring about gradual
or abrupt changes in legal culture that lead to far-reaching changes in social culture. As
Gaines suggests, “[s]ocial value transformations can happen quickly once ideas catch hold.”
Gaines, supra note 72, at 10213.
219. Part of ensuring the effective use of law, however, must also include developing
what Gaines calls a “fresh outlook on the role of law in society and the training of lawyers as
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responses to climate change, however, requires heightened efforts on the
part of civil society and the private sector both in demanding and facilitat-
ing these changes. Within the realm of climate change, even the world’s
most respected scientists and administrative agents struggle to keep pace
with, much less get out in front of, environmental changes as they emerge
and evolve. What hope have our law and policy makers, then, of compre-
hending much less getting out ahead of climate change and other global
environmental problems absent concerted efforts to make this a truly collec-
tive effort? Collective not only in terms of transnational cooperation, but
also in terms of inclusiveness and efforts to draw upon the civil society and
the private sector, who in their collective, individual, public, and private
capacities shape global capacity for change.
V. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW AT THE BRINK: THE WAGER OF OUR GENERATION
Climate change is a problem of and for international environmental
law. It is that, but it is also much more. The continuing inability of interna-
tional environmental law to “solve” climate change dooms neither the inter-
national environmental law project nor the climate change project.
Acknowledging this relationship—and, really, the limits of this relation-
ship—allows us to maximize how we use the tools of international environ-
mental law to address climate change and the host of other environmental
problems we face. It also forces us to think more critically about how we are
going to address climate change moving forward.
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of the Article: can
international environmental law deal with the big issues? In partial response
to this question, Speth lamented that:
A serious disease is attacking Mother Earth, and, in response, we
have dispensed pitifully weak medicine. This is not to say that the
medicine did nothing—it helped a bit—but it also compounded the
problem by making people mistakenly think that an effective re-
sponse was being administered.220
Behind the efforts rallied by the development of international environ-
mental law, the world changed and it changed quickly and dramatically.
Those changes—that “phenomenal expansion of economic activity”221—at
social and business leaders cognizant of the natural world who are oriented to restructuring
social norms and economic behaviors in order to alleviate today’s extreme pressures on eco-
systems and preserve social and ecological resilience for future generations.” See id. at 10188.
220. Speth, supra note 24, at 780-81.
221. Id. at 795.
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first blurred and later all but erased the lines between what is a big environ-
mental issue and what is simply a big issue. But while the lines disappeared
in reality, they persist in our legal constructs, in our political constructs,
even in our more pluralistic governance constructs.
Over a decade ago, Speth framed his comments about the future of
international environmental law amidst the belief that:
There is still world enough and time for this century to see the
coming of a future that gives primacy to human solidarity and envi-
ronmental sustainability. But this future will not be won without a
profound commitment to urgent action.222
In his vision, international environmental law “has an essential role to
play in addressing the major challenges of the global environment, but it
can play that role only in a dramatically different context.”223
A decade later, this remains true. However, the space that we have to
achieve that future has contracted. Within this constrained space, interna-
tional environmental law has an invaluable role to play in improving the
quality of the human environment, but we have made little ground in
achieving the dramatically different context that is necessary to achieve
these changes. The dramatically different context that we need requires us
to break free from the idea that it is possible to address climate change, one
of the most important issues of our time, without exploding the myth that
this issue can be addressed without fundamental social, economic, and polit-
ical shifts. Shifts that require much more than relegating resolution of this
issue to a hard-working and productive, but youthful, body of law that sits
at the margins of power.
Demonstrating the constraints of the space within which we operate
and the urgency of the shifts needed, in May 2013, the earth crossed an
unprecedented threshold: carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere ex-
ceeded 400 ppm for the first time in recorded history.224 As the chasm
between global goals and global accomplishments widened, the earth’s at-
mosphere sounded a loud and clear warning call. Responding to that call
requires us to be clear and direct in saying: more is needed.
The stakes are high and we are at a critical moment in determining our
collective future. Confronting the similarly existential crises of nuclear war-
fare, Albert Camus famously opined:
222. Id. at 796.
223. Id.
224. CO2 at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New Milestone: Tops 400 ppm,
NOAA (May 10, 2013, 3:45 PM), http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html.
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We have nothing to lose except everything. So let’s go ahead. This
is the wager of our generation. If we are to fail, it is better, in any
case, to have stood on the side of those who choose life than on the
side of those who are destroying.225
Climate change is the wager of our generation. We can choose to do
nothing and face an uncertain future or we can choose to do something and
begin a deliberate revolution. A revolution based on optimism and the he-
roic assumption that we are capable of dealing with the big issues.
225. ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH: ESSAYS 246 (1960) (expressed in
the face of looming atomic war).
